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PROLOGUE 
This academic venture is devoted for a research project in the shape of 
dissertation entitled: 'Maintenance of Wife under the Personal Laws: An 
evaluative Analysis' to fulfill the partial requirement for the award of LL .M. 
degree by the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, (U.P.), India. It covers the 
position of the law of maintenance of wife under existing person laws in 
India. Maintenance of wife under Hindu Law, Muslim Law, Christian 1 aw 
and Parsi Law is being evaluated critically. The parameters of the analysis is 
devoted taking into account the existing legislative position for governing the 
law of maintenance covering four major communities: Hindu, Muslim, 
Christian, Parsi. Besides evaluating the legislative provisions leading case law 
having the bearing of maintenance of wife in relation to four communities . 
are studied critically. Efforts have been focused to identify the pitfalls and 
shortcomings in the area of legislative provisions alongwith case law. Strong 
advocacy has been made for improving the situation suggesting reforms and 
improvements. 
According to workplan of the present academic venture, evaluation and 
analysis of the law of maintenance of wife belonging to the four communities 
in India as specified above, the work is divided into five parts. Part A is 
devoted to analyze the maintenance of wife under Hindu Law having four 
sub-themes dealing with: (a) Analysis of the legislative provisions, (b) 
Evaluation of the judicial pronouncements, (c) Identification of pitfalls, (d) 
Advocacy of reforms and improvements. Likewise, Part B is devoted to the 
maintenance of wife under Muslim Law dealing with the : (a) Analysis of the 
legislative provisions, (b) Evaluation of the judicial pronouncements, (c) 
Identification of pitfalls, (d) Advocacy of reforms and improvements. Part C 
deals with the maintenance of wife under Christian Law. Under this broad 
caption sub-themes are devoted: (a) Analysis of the legislative provisions, (b) 
Evaluation of the judicial pronouncements, (c) Identification of pitfalls, (d) 
Advocacy of reforms and improvements. Part D deals with the maintenance 
of wife under Parsi Law having four sub-themes, namely: (a) Analysis of the 
legislative provisions, (b) Evaluation of the judicial pronouncements, (c) 
Identification of pitfalls, (d) Advocacy of reforms and improvements. Part H 
is devoted to analyze the position of maintenance with the highlights of 
distinctive features of the law of maintenance of wife under four personal 
laws as specified above on comparative basis. 
As indicated above part A deals with the relevant provisions of current law of 
maintenance of wife under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. According to the workplan. the 
evaluation of the judicial pronouncements handed down by different High 
Courts and Supreme Courts with regard to maintenance of wife under Hindu 
Law have been evaluated. In the process of the evaluation of the judicial 
pronouncements, the issues involved, the contentious issues raised b> the 
contesting parties, are studied focusing on the merits and demerits of the 
judicial pronouncements. By virtue of objective analysis, identification of 
pitfalls have been made suggesting for reformation. It is worthnoting that the 
area of pitfalls has been found in the process of analyzing the legislative 
provisions and the evaluation of the judicial pronouncements. By advancing 
the effective advocacy for reforms, suggestions have been made for makmg 
the law of maintenance of wife effective and gender justice oriented. 
Part B consists chapter 1 which deals with the maintenance of wife under the 
Muslim Personal Law in India. The position of maintenance of wife under the 
Muslim Personal Law is dealt with relying on the textual material. The 
controversy with regard to the definition of wife as given under the Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973, with regard to the maintenance of wife has been 
discussed thoroughly highlighting the objections raised by the Muslim 
Scholars. Muslims launched agitation against the controversial judgment of 
Shah Banc's case which uUimately paved the way of enactment of the 
Mushm Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. This Act came 
into being because of the popular demand of the Muslim community of India 
and initially same was found to be satisfactory, but later on, the whimsical 
interpretation of judiciary created controversy and has left Muslim 
community unsatisfied. Identification of pitfalls establishes some loopholes 
with regard to the drafting of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986. The effective study has been made focusing on judicial 
activism which was uncalled for as the same caused intrusion in the area of 
the Muslim Personal Law dealing with the maintenance of wife. 
Part C of this dissertation consists of chapter 1 which deals with the 
maintenance of wife under Christian Law. The analysis of the relevant 
legislative provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, dealing with the 
maintenance of wife under Christian Law. Further, it deals with the evaluation 
of the judicial pronouncements, identification of pitfalls, advocacy of reforms 
and improvements are discussed shortly. 
Part D of this dissertation consists of Chapter 1 which deals with the 
maintenance of wife under the Parsi Law. The analysis of the legislative 
provisions, evaluation of the judicial pronouncements, identification of 
pitfalls, advocacy of reforms and improvements constitute the major aspects 
of this. It deals with the relevant provisions of Parsi Marriage and Divorce 
Act, 1988, dealing with the maintenance of wife under the Parsi Law. Judicial 
pronouncements have been analyzed critically, pitfalls have also been 
identified alongwith this the effective advocacy have been made for reforms. 
The last part of this dissertation deals with the comparative analysis of all the 
four personal laws dealing with the maintenance of wife. It is also pointed out 
that how the one personal law has already contributed in developing and in 
process of updating with regard to the maintenance of wife. Our Country 
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which is known for its diversities can't live in isolation and thus it is ahnost 
impossible for any community to avoid the influence of other communii\. 
This work ends with 'Epilogue' which deals with suggestive note to be taken 
into account by the advocates of reforms in the area of existing personal laws 
specially dealing with the maintenance of wife . Indeed, this dissertation is an 
humble addition to the existing knowledge with regard to the maintenance of 
wife under existing personal laws. This work appends a rich bibliography 
which not only reveal about the exhaustive survey which the humble 
researcher has ventured, but provides rich material which can be utilized for 
further meaningful study and research in the area of maintenance of wife 
under the existing personal laws dealing with the Hindu, Muslim, Christian, 
Parsi community in India. 
To accomplish research venture the researcher relied on the "Doctrinal 
Research Methodology'. It is a library based research. To know about the 
legislative provisions and to trace the landmark judicial pronouncements, the 
library of the Supreme Court of India, New Delhi, Indian Law Institute. New 
Delhi, Allahabad High Court and the Seminar Library of the Faculty of Law, 
A.M.U., Aligarh have been duly perused. 
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PART A 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation the Part A consist the Chapter 1 which is the 'Maintenance 
of Wife under the Hindu Law. This chapter has been discussed under the 
following headings: (a) Analysis of the legislative provisions (b) Evaluation 
of the judicial pronouncements (c) Identification of pitfalls (d) Advocacy of 
reforms and improvements. It deals with the relevant provisions of Modern 
Hindu Law regarding the Maintenance of wife. It is a noteworthy fact that the 
maintenance of wife under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The 'evaluation of the judicial 
pronouncements' in which the judicial pronouncements of the various High 
Courts and Hon'ble Supreme Court regarding the maintenance of wife under 
the Hindu Laws have been evaluated. In the process of the evaluation of the 
judicial pronouncements the issue involved in the case, the contention of the 
petitioner and the respondent, the order or the judgments of the respective 
High Courts or the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the merits or the demerits of 
the judgments has been humbly tried to put forth. Further, 'the identification 
of pitfalls' deals with the areas which has been in the serious requirement to 
be noticed and calls for some responsible steps for the reformation by the 
appropriate authority. The areas of the pitfalls has been found during the 
process of the analysis of the legislative provisions and the evaluation of the 
judicial pronouncements. Lastly 'the advocacy for reforms and improvements 
which deals with the suggestions and the progressive ideas for coping up with 
these areas of pitfalls. 
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CHAPTER! 
MAINTENANCE OF WIFE UNDER HINDU LAW 
(a) Analysis of Legislative Provisions 
The relevant legislations which govern the maintenance of wife under Hindu 
law are: The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act, 1956. Provisions contained therein would be discussed to 
know the legislative position of wife under Hindu law. The rele\ant 
provisions are: section 24, and section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
and section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. Section 24 
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, deals with the alimony pendente lite and the 
expenses of the proceedings. This section empowers the court to order the 
respondent to pay the petitioner the expenses of the proceedings , if it appears 
that either wife or the husband has not independent income for his or her 
support and to meet out the necessary expenses of the proceedings. It is to be 
noted that the court while making order under this section, pays due regard to 
the petitioner's own income and the income of the respondent. 
The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 2001 was introduced. This 
amendment inserted the proviso in section 24 of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955, which aimed to fix the duration of six months in the disposal of the 
application of the payment of the expenses of the proceeding and monthly 
sum during proceeding within the sixty days from the date of the service of 
notice on the wife or husband, as the case may be. Section 25 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 deals with the permanent alimony and maintenance. It 
comprises three subsections. Subsection 1 of this section deals with the 
condition where any husband or wife may for the permanent alimon> or 
maintenance at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent 
thereto. This subsection empowers the court to order the respondent to pay the 
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maintenance and support the gross sum or the monthly or periodical sum lor a 
term not exceeding the life of applicant. According to this subsection the 
responsibility of the paying spouse ends on the marriage of the other spouse. 
The court fixes the amount of permanent alimony and maintenance, keeping 
in view the respondent's own income and other property and the income and 
other property of the applicant. The court may, if necessary, also secure the 
payment of permanent alimony by a charge on the immovable property ol the 
husband. Subsection 2 of this section says that after the passing of the order of 
the payment of permanent alimony under this section, in case the court is 
satisfied that there is a change in the circumstances of either party. In this 
condition, the court may, at the instances of either party, vary, modif> or 
rescind any such order in such manner as court deems just. Subsection 3 of 
this section empowers the court to rescind the order of the payment of 
permanent alimony, if it is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order 
has been passed under this section has been remarried or if such party is the 
wife ,that she has not remained chaste , or if such party is the husband , that 
he had sexual intercourse with any woman outside the wedlock. 
Section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, deals with the 
married women's right to reside separate and claim maintenance. This section 
comprises three subsections. Subsection 1 of this section entitles the Hindu 
wife to get the maintenance from her husband during her life time. The right 
to be maintained is irrespective of the fact that whether she was married 
before or after the commencement of the Act. Subsection 2 of this section 
provides justifiable grounds to the Hindu wife under clause (a) to clause (g) 
which entitle the Hindu wife to live separately from her husband without 
forfeiting her claim to maintenance. The grounds are desertion, cruelty 
leprosy, having the another wife by the husband, keeping a concubine by the 
husband, conversion from Hinduism to another religion by the husband or any 
other justifiable cause. 
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Subsection 3 of this section disentitles the Hindu wife to separate residence 
and claim of maintenance from her husband if she is unchaste or ceases to be 
a Hindu by conversion to another religion. 
The rule laid down in section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and maintenance Act. 
1956 must also be read with section 23 of this Act which lays down that it 
shall be the discretion of the court to determine whether any, and if so v\ hat 
maintenance shall be awarded under the provisions of this Act'. Here in this 
section, the right of the Hindu wife whether married before or after the 
commencement of this Act, to be maintained by her husband during her life 
time has been, reiterated substantially in subsection (1).However, ihis 
subsection (1) must be read with subsection (2) and subsection (3). Subsection 
(3) is an exception to subsection (1) which lays down that the Hindu wife can 
not claim separate residence and maintenance, if she is unchaste or ceases to 
be a Hindu by conversion to another religion. Subsection (2) shows the 
justifiable ground upon which a Hindu wife lives separately from her husband 
without forfeiting her claim to maintenance. 
Clause (a) of subsection 2 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. 1956 
deals with the "Desertion of wife by husband". This clause aims at giving the 
meaning of desertion as abandonment of the wife by the husband without 
reasonable cause without her consent or against her will or willful neglect of 
the wife by the husband. It accords with the meaning given to the expression 
as used in section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. The only distinction 
between section 18(2) (a), and explanation to section 13(1), the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 is that under the latter the petitioner should show the 
respondent had deserted him or her for a period of 2 years prior to the 
presentation of the while under section 18(2)(a) of the Hindu Adoption and 
maintenance Act, 1956, desertion might be any duration^. A full bench of the 
' Mulla, Principles of Hindu Law ( ed. 19* ,^ 2006, New Delhi), p. 565 
" Preeti Sharma , Hindu Women's Right to maintenance (ed. I, 1990, New Delhi) p. 135 
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Kerela High Court has held that if a husband had deserted the wife, the wife 
need not give the proof of animus^. 
Clause (b) of section 18(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 
deals with the "cruelty" by the husband to wife. For succeeding the claim of 
cruelty, the wife must prove two distinct element, first, ill treatment 
complained of, and secondly, the result and danger of apprehension thereof 
Any conduct of husband which causes disgrace of wife or subject to a course 
of annoyance and indignity amounts to legal cruelty. The harm apprehended 
by the wife may be a mental suffering as distinct from bodily harm, because 
the pain of the mind may be even more severe than bodily pain"*. 
In Swajyam Prabha v. A.S. Chandra Shekhar^ , it was held that "the baseless 
allegations about the adultery would constitute mental cruelty to the wife, so 
that cruelty is a solid ground for claiming maintenance and separate 
residence". It is well settled principle of law that leveling allegations of 
adultery without proper foundation and basis would tantamount to 
perpetrating mental cruelty on the other spouse^.In Ram Devi v/s Raja Ram . 
the husband by his conduct made it evidently clear that she was not wanted in 
the house and her presence was resented by him, it was held that this 
amounted to cruelty and justified wife's living separately. 
Clause (c) of section 18(2) of the Hindu Adopfion and Maintenance Act, 
1956, deals with the "Leprosy" of the husband. A Hindu wife is also entitled 
to live separately from her husband and has a right to claims maintenance 
from him on the ground that he is suffering from a virulent form of leprosy It 
may be noted that no period is prescribed, but it must be existing at the time 
^ Raghavan v. Satyabhama Jaya Kumari A.I.R 1985 Kerela 193 (F.B) 
•* Supra note : 2 , p. 136 
' A I R 1982 Kant. 295 
'' Madan Mohan v. Sarda AIR 1967 Punj. 397; Iqba! Kaur v. Pritam Singh AIR 1963 Punj, 242; 
Mohinder kaur v. Bhagram AIR 1979 P & H 71 
' 1963 All. 564 
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when the claim for maintenance is made^. It does not make any effect whether 
the disease started before or after the coming into force of the Act''.A mild 
type of leprosy which is capable of treatment can not be called \irulent 
leprosy which is malignant and contiguous and in which prognosis is usually 
grave"'. 
Clause (d) of section (18)2 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 
deals with the ground which is "the husband having another wife. A Hindu 
husband can not marry another wife after the commencement of the Hindu 
marriage Act, 1955. Act lays down monogamy as a rule of law. This gives the 
right to a wife to claim maintenance, while living separately without forfeiting 
her claim to maintenance on the ground that his husband has another wife 
living with him. The interpretation of this subsection has resulted into 
conflicting judicial pronouncements by the entitlement of the second wife to 
claim maintenance from the husband after the commencement of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 . In Annamalai v. perumayee Ammamal'^, the High 
Court of Madras has held that clause (d) of sec-18(2), would apply onl> in 
case of marriage solemnized before this Act came into operation. The Andhra 
Pradesh High Court had earlier taken the view that the second wife would be 
entitled to claim maintenance under this provision'^ The High Court of 
Calcutta has taken the view that second wife would not be so entitled'''. The 
Madhya Pradesh High Court as well as the Bombay High Court had in the 
context of Sections 24-25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and also taking 
into consideration of present Section had expressed the view that the 
expression 'wife' and 'husband' used in the Act can not be given a strict 
literal meaning so as to convey only a legally married husband and wife. It 
'Supra Note: 4, p. 137 
' Supra Note: 1 p. 569 
'" Sivaraya v. C.C. Padma Rao (1974) 1. SCJ 79 
"Supra Note: I p. 570 
" A . I . R . 1965 Mad 139, 141 
" C. Obuia Konda Reddy V. C. Pedda Venkata AIR 1976 AP 
'•* Ranjit Bhattacharya v. Sabita AIR 1996 Cal 301 
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was also held that the word used in section would refer to parties who have 
gone through the ceremonies of marriage, and the court can make order of 
maintenance at the instance of the second wife'^.The Andhra Pradesh High 
Court in a recent full bench decision over ruled the earlier decision while 
holding that second wife is not entitled to maintenance under this section. 
since after coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, bigamous 
marriage is prohibited. The second Marriage being void, the second wife 
cannot claim maintenance under this section since the parties to the marriage 
will not have the status of legally married husband and wife'^. The decision of 
the High Court of the Bombay in Kirshnakant's Case was overruled by the 
decision of the Full Bench. 
In Bhau saheb v. Lilabai' which took the view that petition challenging the 
nullity of marriage by Virtue of Section 5(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, 
is petition seeking declaration of the nullity of the marriage and is not a 
petition affecting marital status and thus, would not entitle the wife if such is 
void marriage to the relief of maintenance. The Court held that the words 'any 
decree' in Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act can't be construed to mean 
'every decree' so as to entitle such spouse to maintenance. The Supreme 
Court has in the context of entitlement to a spouse of void marriage, now held 
that once there is a decree of nullity in respect of void marriage such spouse 
would be entitled to maintenance. The Court taking note of its earlier decision 
m. the Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lai Dhawan held that decision clearly 
stipulated that once there is decree bringing about disruption of marital tie, 
including a decree nullifying a void marriage, the spouse was entitled to 
maintenance. 
" Laxmi Bai v. Ayodhya Prasad AIR 1991 p. 47; Krishnakant v. Reema AIR 1999 Bom 127 
'^  Abayalla M Subbareddy v. Padmamma AIR 1999 AP 19 (F.B); Soloman v. Jaini Bai AIR 2004 
Mad. 460 (void marriage - second wife not entitled) 
"JT2004(I0)SC366 
"JT2004(10)SC366 
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Section 25 of the Hindu marriage Act, 1955 applies on the disruption of the 
marriage tie, as explained and interpreted by Supreme Court in above 
decisions, whereas Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act. 1956 applies in cases where the marriage Subsists and confers upon the 
wife the right to claim maintenance without seeking disruption and the 
marriage tie' . 
In fact Supreme Court while analyzing the provisions of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955 in Ramesh Chandra Daga v. Rameshwari Daga stated where the 
marriage is not dissolved by any decree of the court, resort to section 25 ol'the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is not allowed as any of the spouse whose marriage 
continues can resort to any other provision like section 125 of Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 or section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act, 1956. 
It appears that though the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the second marriage 
during the life time of first wife, the present sections does not clearly states 
that it is only the legally married wife who can claim maintenance in the 
above circumstance. If it had been the language of the section the claim of the 
second wife would necessary fail . 
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which prohibited bigamy, was enacted before 
the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The legislature therefore 
conscious of the fact that the Hindu marriage Act, 1955, prohibited of 
bigamous marriage, and yet the present section, as it stands today had been 
enacted. It is submitted that if the legislative intent in the context of this 
section were to grant the right of maintenance only to a legally married wi fe. 
it would have clearly stated so. It is worth while to note that maintenance 
under section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 has been 
"Supra Note: 1 p. 571 
^"JT2004(10)SC366 
'^ Supra Note: I p. 571 -572 
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construed the beneficial piece of legislation. It also appears that the word 
'husband' and wife in the context of this section cannot be read to convex 
only a legally needed but be read as conveying the meaning of person u ho 
have undergone the ceremonies of marriage. The provision as it stands to(ia\ 
is widely worded so as to sustain the claim of maintenance by second wife. 
The claim is maintainable irrespective of the fact that the other marriage had 
taken place after or before the marriage of applicant wife, provided the other 
wife is living . The word any other wife living, in this clause are of 
sufficiently wide connection to include any wife other them the wife claimmg 
maintenance under this section. The meaning is not confined to a wife who is 
9T 
junior to the wife who is claimant , nor is it necessary that the husband and 
other wife should be living together. The word living here means alive and 
not living with the husband^'', A Second wife who had abandoned her husband 
for no justifiable reasons and not for immoral purpose would be entitled to 
live separately from the husband by virtue of present clause, and claim 
maintenance under present section^^. 
Clause (e) of section 18(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 
deals with a ground which is "husband keeping a Concubine". A Hindu wife 
is also entitled to live separately from her husband and claim maintenance 
from him and the ground that he keeps a concubine in the same house in 
which she is living or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere. In the 
second part of this clause, the emphasis is the 'habitually' and not so much on 
residence^^. It is not necessary that the husband should have actually shifted 
his residence to the place where concubine lives. 
Clause (f) of section 18(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 
deals with the ground which is "husband ceased to be a Hindu by conversion'" 
" Ibid p. 572 
" Jagamma v. Satyanarayana Murti AIR 1958 All 582 
^* Kalawati v. Ratan Chand AIR 1960 All 601 
" Ram Prakash v. Savitri Devi AIR 1958 Punj: 87 
'^' Kesar bai v. Hari Bhan AIR 1975 Bom. 115 
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A Hindu wife is entitled to live separately from her husband if he has ceased 
to be a Hindu. However, the terms Hindu in this clause must be understood in 
the wide sense given to it in Section 2 as will be seen from subsection } of 
that section. So husband continues to be a Hindu even though he may have 
been converted to any other of four religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism. 
Sikhism. Conversion in the present context implies that the husband has 
voluntarily relinquished his religion and adopted another religion after a 
formal ceremonial conversion; A Hindu does not cease to be a Hindu merely 
because he professes an ardent admirer and advocate of such religion and its 
practices .However if he abdicate his religion by a clear act of renunciation 
and adopts the other religion, he would cease to be Hindu within the meaning 
of that clause. 
Clause (g) of this section 18(2) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 
1956 deals with the ground which is 'any other justifiable cause'. It is a 
residue clause; it runs, "if there is any other cause justifying her living 
separately". For seeking in the remedy under this clause the conduct of the 
husband should be such that, in the opinion of the court, the wife has 'grave 
and weighty' or grave and convincing reason for withdrawing from the 
society of the husband and it would amount to a justifiable cause. It is 
submitted that all those cases where the court may refer husband's petition for 
the restitution of conjugal right will be covered under this clause entitling a 
wife to claim separate residence & maintenance under this clause^ . In 
Subbegowda v. Hoonamma, wife claimed maintenance on the ground that 
husband treated her with cruelty and that he remarried and was living with 
second wife. The charge of cruelty was not established, but it was found by 
the court that husband was living with woman, having illicit relation with her 
and from which a child was bom. Since marriage with this wife was not 
" Supra Note: 1 p. 574 
*^ KesarBai v. Haribhan AIR 1974 bom 115 
^ ' A I R 1984 Kant. 41 
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established, the case was not covered by clause (d) of section 18(2). The court 
held that this was nonetheless a just cause for her to live separate and she was 
entitled to claim maintenance. The court took recourse to clause (g). 
But according to subsection (3) of section 18, a Hindu wife shall not be 
entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if she is 
unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion. 
(b) Evaluation of judicial pronouncements 
Now, some landmark judicial decisions would be discussed here to clarify the 
application of these sections in the matrimonial cases .First of all, we would 
like to discuss the application of section 24 and section 25 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act,1955,then some cases would be discussed regarding the 
application of section-18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 
In Bani v. Par/cash^", the question before the High Court was that in case of 
non compliance an order under section 24 of the Hindu marriage Act, 1955. 
can be the defence of the defaulter. Husband obtained a decree of divorce 
against the wife on the ground of cruelty. She filed an appeal against it. 
During pendency of appeal, she sought maintenance and litigation expenses 
under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The court decreed Rs. 500 
per month as mainienance pendente lite and Rs.2, 200 as litigation expenses. 
The husband failed to comply with this order despite several notices over a 
period of two years. The court observed: "Law is not that powerless as not to 
bring the husband to book. If the husband has failed to make the payment of 
maintenance and litigation expenses to wife, his defence be struck out." The 
verdict of the High Court in this case shows that the purpose behind this is to 
ensure that a husband provides for the wife and children while the litigation is 
on. If he fails to do so, his defence will be struck out and the case will 
proceed. 
' "AIR 1964 P&H 175 
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In Sushila Viresh Chhawda v. Viresh Nagsi Chhawda^', the issue invohcd in 
this case was whether the Utigation expenses and interim maintenance under 
section 24 can be claimed, even when the main petition is for nulHty ol the 
marriage. Husband filed a suit for nullity of marriage under the Hindu 
Marriage Act on the ground of fraud. His allegation was that the wife 
suffering from a big ovarian tumour which had to be surgically removed 
along with an ovary just eight days after the marriage and this fact that the 
tumour was concealed at the time of marriage. The wife filed an application 
for interim maintenance under section 24 of Hindu marriage Act. This was 
opposed by the husband on the ground that the marriage was void and the 
view of the fraud committed by her, she was not entitled to interim 
maintenance. The family court rejected the wife's application without even 
going into merits. Hence her special leave petition under Article 227 of the 
constitution. The High Court set aside the order of the family court. It was 
held that the wording of section 24 the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is very 
clear that an application for maintenance can be filed in any proceeding under 
the Act,"When a fact of marriage is acknowledged and a proved, alimony 
follows subject, of course, to the discretion of the court in matter having 
regard to the means of the parties and it would be no answer to the claim. 
That the marriage was void ipso jure or was voidable." The court further 
remarked: "The direction of interim alimony and expenses of litigation under 
section 24 is one of urgency and it must be decided as soon as it is raised and 
the law take care that nobody is disabled from prosecuting or defending the 
matrimonial case by starvation or lack of funds". The purpose of section 24 is 
to provide sustenance and financial assistance for pursuing the litigation. The 
provision is available in case of any proceeding under the Act and not 
confined to any particular proceeding. 
" A I R 1996 Bom. 94 
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In Lataben Y. Goswami v. Yogendra Kumar S. Goswami , the issue before 
the Gujrat High Court was whether the husband can be absolved of the 
hability to pay arrears of interim maintenance to the wife, after allowing 
dismissal of this main petition under the Act? In the instant case, husband 
filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights under section 9 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955, whereupon the wife applied for maintenance under 
section 24, Hindu marriage Act, 1955. The court allowed Rs. 200 per month 
as interim maintenance and Rs. 300 towards litigation expenses. The husband 
challenged this but his application was rejected. He was given sufficient time 
for making the payment which he failed to do. He made no appearance on 
subsequent dates either in person or through counsel; hence the same was 
dismissed for non-prosecution. The wife filed an application for recovery of 
arrears of maintenance amount w.e.f., April 1, 1988 to August 5, 1993. Ihe 
same was turned down as being not maintainable in view of the dismissal of 
the main petition of the husband. Hence, the wife's revision. It was argued on 
behalf of the wife that under the provision of section 28(a) of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, all decree and orders made by it in any proceeding under the 
Act are enforceable in the same marmer as decrees and orders of the made in 
the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. And further, it was contended that 
an order for alimony pendente lite remains in force during pendenc}' of 
proceedings and in this case the proceedings under section 9 for the restitution 
of conjugal rights remained pending till the application was dismissed on 
August 5, 1993 and so the wife was entitled to the arrears. After going 
through the contentions of both the parties, the wife's revision was allowed. 
The court observed "That the finding of the learned trial court that the interim 
order passed in any proceedings would itself get extinguished or lost the 
sanctity with the ultimate fate of the main proceedings is perverse in the face 
of it. In case such interpretation is given, then the whole purpose enacting the 
" A I R 1996 Guj 103 
13 
Part A: Chapter 1: Maintenance of Wife under Hindu Law 
aforesaid section of the Act will be frustrated. Not only this, but it will he 
easy for a spouse who does not want to pay the amount of the maintenance or 
the cost of litigation despite the order of the Court to deny the same b\ 
allowing the dismissal of the petition for non-prosecution. Section 28A was 
substituted in the Act of 1955 to mitigate the hardships". Here it can be said 
that the decision is praiseworthy as the husband cannot be allowed to defeat 
the claim of the wife to the arrears of maintenance by simply dropping or not 
proceeding with the main petition. This would not only be unfair but also the 
defiance of court order. 
In Ghari Lai v. Surjit Kaur , the issue before the High Court of Jammu and 
Kashmir was under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of 
delay be termed as proceedings for purposes of section 24 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act,1955.In that case the husband obtained an ex-parte restitution 
decree against the wife. The wife filed an application for setting aside the 
same after the period of limitation had expired. She also filed an application 
under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. Pending this 
application, she filed an application under section 30 of the J & K Hmdu 
Marriage Act (4 of 1980) for maintenance. (This section of the J&K Act in 
pari material with section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955) The husband 
objected to her application on the ground that proceeding under section 5 of 
the Limitation Act could not be considered as proceeding for purpose of grant 
of maintenance. His plea was, however, rejected. Hence, he appealed. Ihc 
husband's appeal was admitted. The High Court reiterated the decesion on 
Puran Chand V Kamla Devi^\ where it was held that maintenance is 
awardable on monthly basis "during the proceeding which connotes that 
maintenance is admissible from the time of commencement of the 
proceedings till their termination. According to the court proceeding in trial 
court would naturally commence from the date on which issues are framed 
" A I R 1997J&K72 
'^AIR 1981 J&K 5 
14 
Part A: Chapter I: Maintenance of Wife under Hindu Law 
and since there can be no stage of framing of issues in an application seeking 
condonation of delay in proceedings under section 5 of the Limitation Act. 
section 30 of the J&K Hindu marriage Act cannot apply. Accordingh, the 
court held that application for condonation of delay was not a proceeding 
within the meaning of section 30 of the J&K Hindu marriage Act (or section 
24 of the Hindu Marriage Act). While conceding that this provision seeks to 
help a litigating spouse who does not have sufficient means to maintain 
himself/herself, the court observed that provision cannot be used in such a 
way that it acts as a weapon of sword for harassment of the other party. 
Virtually the strict interpretation of the provision can work hardship on the 
party sometimes. Supposedly wife obtains an ex-parte order and the husband 
files an application for setting aside and condonation of delay for seeking 
restoration of the order only to harass the wife, would the court deny her 
expenses to fight out the application? Each case needs to be decided on its 
own facts and circumstances. 
In Amit Kumar Sharma v. Vlth Addl. District and Session Judge, Bijnor the 
issue before the Allahabad High Court was whether a husband's mother's 
needs be taken care of in a wife application for maintenance when the mother 
is staying with her? In that case the husband filed a petition for divorce. 
Thereupon, the wife filed application for maintenance under section 24 and 25 
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, claiming maintenance for herself, two 
minor children and ailing mother of the husband who too was staying with 
her. The same was allowed by the trial court and affirmed by the additional 
district judge in appeal. The husband filed an appeal against the order. Ihe 
court held that section 24 contemplates maintenance either to wife or husband 
and the mother is in no way connected with the lis relating to marriage 
between the husband and wife. The court observed that the Indian social 
^' AIR 1999 All 4 
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fabric involves maintenance of parents with religious scruples and devotion 
but the court is called upon to interpret the law and not religious or social 
duties. Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. and section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act are there to take care of the Parents maintenance rights 
according to the court. The court further held that where there is specific 
provision of law on the basis of religious scruples or social system, it could 
not be permissible to stretch section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act, 1956, nor it can overlap the said sections. Section 24 of the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, does not postulate the scope of granting 
maintenance to the mother of the husband even when she is ailing and lives 
with the applicant. Maintenance award in favour of the mother was 
accordingly set aside by the High Court. 
On evaluation of this decision of High Court it may be pointed out that here 
the court has taken a very rigid and technical view. Further, while awarding 
maintenance in an application the court considers, inter alia, the needs of the 
applicant. Besides, under section 25 "any other circumstances of the case" is a 
relevant consideration. When the husband's mother, whom in any case he is 
liable to maintain, is staying with his estranged wife, who is taking care of her 
needs, including medical treatment, the court should have given due 
consideration to these needs rather than driving her (the mother) to file 
separate suits for maintenance under the provision of the Cr. P.C. or Hindu 
Adoption and maintenance Act, 1956. 
In Meshchandra Rampratapji Daga v. Rameshwari Rameshchandra Daga^^'. 
the Bombay High Court has held that the wife is not entitled to maintenance if 
the marriage is void. The observations of the court in Krishnakant v. Reenu^\ 
were referred to "that the Hindu Marriage Act, 955, is a piece of social 
' ' ' (2001) I Femi-Juris CC 60 (Bom) 
"(1999)1 MahLJ388 
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welfare legislation regulating the marital relations of Hindus consistently with 
their customary law, i.e. Hindu law. The object behind section 24 of the Act 
providing for maintenance pendente lite to a party in matrimonial procecthng 
is obviously to financial assistance to the indigent spouse to maintain herself 
during the pendency of the proceedings and also have sufficient funds to carry 
on the litigations so that the spouse does not unduly suffer in the conduct of 
the case for want of fiinds. The words 'wife' or 'Husband' used in section 24 
of the Act include a man and a woman who have gone through the ceremony 
of hindu marriage which would have been valid but for the provisions of 
section II read with clause (i) of secdon 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act.1955. 
These words have been used as convenient terms to refer to the parties who 
have gone through a ceremony of marriage whether or not that marriage is 
valid or subsisting, just as word marriage has been used in the Act to include a 
purported marriage which is void ab initio''. 
In Padmavathi v. C. Lakshminarayana^^, the question before the Karnataka 
High Court was whether the mere fact that the wife being educated is capable 
of earning, defeat her claim for maintenance under section 24 of the Hmdu 
Marriage Act, 1955? It was held by the High Court that the only condition for 
granting maintenance under section 24 is that the applicant has no 
independent income sufficient for support. The court observed that the object 
of section 24 would be defeated if the interim maintenance is denied during 
the matrimonial proceedings on the ground that the wife is capable of earning 
her living because of her qualification. It further remarked by the Court that 
the reasoning of the family court judge was "not only contrary to settled legal 
position but the spirit and purpose of section 24 of the Act". The decision 
seems to be correct that the mere fact that the wife is capable of earning, 
without any contendon or proof that she is in fact earning, does not disentitle 
" A I R 2002 Kant 424 
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the wife to claim maintenance under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955. 
In R. Suresh v. Chandra , the court has elucidated the concept and meaning 
of term support in section- 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and held that 
the expense incurred on medical treatment would also be covered in the v\ ord 
'support' It was held that since the word "support" in section 24 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act,1955, was not defined, it should be given dictionary meaning or 
as understood in general parlance. Further, the court can draw inspiration 
from the word "maintenance" as defined in section 3(b)(i) of the Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, which includes provision for food, 
clothing, residence, education, medical attendance and treatment. Though this 
definition too is not exhaustive but only inclusive, medical attendance and 
treatment have been specifically mentioned. Referring to Pradeep kiimar 
Kapoor v. Shailja Kapoo/", it was held that the word "supporf" and 
"maintenance" are synonymous and the definition of "maintenance" as given 
in the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, equally applies to the 
word "support" in section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act,1955. As far as the 
point reimbursement from office was concerned, the court held that the issue 
is not of his reimbursement from office but the wife's claim for 
reimbursement from him. The wife was, accordingly, held to be entitled for 
reimbursement of her medical expenses from the husband under section 24 of 
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
In Ramesh Babu v. Usha^, the issue before the Court was that whether the 
applicant who is entitled to free legal aid, can seek litigation expenses under 
section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. In the instant case, a husband 
filed a pefition for annulment of marriage. The wife claimed intermi 
" A I R 2003 Kant 183 
•"'AIR 1989 DEL. 70 
"' AIR 2003 Mad 281 
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maintenance and litigation expenses under section 24 of the Hindi Marriage 
Act, 1955. The family court ordered Rs. 2,500 towards litigation expenses and 
Rs. 1,250 per month as interim maintenance. Both were dissatisfied and filed 
appeal against the maintainability of the litigation expenses and the wife 
against inadequacy of the amount of interim maintenance. The husband's 
argument was that the wife was entitled to free legal aid and, therefore, he 
was not liable to pay her litigation expenses. The court, however, did not 
accept this argument and held. Though free legal aid is available however. I 
am of the view that on this ground the claim of the deserving person cannot 
be rejected. The amount of interim maintenance was also raised from Rs. 
1,250 to Rs. 3,000 per month as the wife had no independent source of 
income and the carry home salary of the husband was assessed at around Rs. 
9,000 per month. To deny litigation expenses under section 24, only on the 
ground that legal aid available to the applicant is not justified, as was done by 
the Gujarat High Court in K.K. Desai v. A.K. Bhai Desaf\ In this case the 
court rejected a wife's claim for litigation expenses on the ground that she can 
avail free legal aid which is provided by the state. According to the court, in 
that case, the burden cannot be put on the husband merely because the wife 
was ignorant of her right to avail legal aid. The view adopted by the court in 
Ramesh Babu is more realistic and logical. 
In S.S. Bindra v. Tarvinder kau/^, the court had to determine that in a claim 
for maintenance pendente lite what is the crucial time for assessing the 
income of the non-claimant - time of petition of claimant or time of 
order.Here the Court held that in in awarding interim maintenance, one of the 
considerations is that the wife and children shall enjoy the same standard of 
living as the husband, but emphasized that "the intention was not to peg it or 
freeze it to the date of separation". If in term, orders are to be pegged to a 
particular point in time then if income of the earning of the spouse were to 
" ' A I R 2000 Guj 232 
•" A.I.R. 2004 DEL. 242 
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suffer a drastic reduction for any reason including deterioration in his/her 
health, the court would be precluded from making any adjustment because of 
these factors. According to my perception a very logical interpretation indeed. 
If the income of the husband increases manifold between the time of the 
application and order of the judge should not be precluded to fix the amount 
in that basis; and so also if it decreases. It should not be left to the claimant or 
non-complainant to file fresh application for reassessment. 
In Chandra Guha Roy v. Gautam Guha Roy*'', the issue that whether an 
educated young lady should be expected to be capable of maintaining her own 
self or not. In that case, a husband filed a petition for divorce and the wife 
applied maintenance under the section 24 of the Hindu marriage Act 1955 and 
also under the section 125 of Cr. P.C. thereafter, the husband also filed an 
application under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The 
applications of both the parties were dismissed by the trial court. Against the 
wife's applicafion, it was held that the husband was no longer in service as, 
consequent to his arrest after wife's criminal complaints against him. his 
services were terminated. The court further observed that it was a settled 
principle of law that an educated lady can not be encouraged to sit idle 
expecting any allowance from the husband. The wife filed an appeal against 
the order. It was held that the ground for rejection of the wife's applicaition 
was not proper. The income of the husband must be his special knowledge; he 
did not make any attempt to prove either his actual income or his dismissal 
from job, besides, when his application for maintenance was rejected he did 
not challenge the same and this implied that he was not prejudicially affected 
by the order. Above all, according to the court, the husband had filed the 
divorce suit which also incurred expenditure which goes to show that he did 
have some income. In view of all these facts, the matter was remanded for 
fresh trial. According to my point of view in our times of equality, a wife is as 
' ' A I R 2004 Jhar 36 
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much liable to maintain her husband as the husband is to maintain his wife 
depending on the circumstances of the case. However, the trial court" s 
observation in this case that an educated young lady cannot be expected to sit 
idle expecting allowance from the husband, did not find favour with the H igh 
Court. There can, however, be no hard and fast rule in this respect and each 
case would have to be decided on its own fact and situations. 
Now, some cases with regard to the permanent alimony and maintenance 
under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 would be analyzed. In 
Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal Dhawan*, the issue before the court was : Do 
the term "any decree" in section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act include an 
order of dismissal of the petition?.The parties were married in 1972 and had 
three children. In 1985, a petition for divorce by mutual consent was filed in 
the purported to have been filed jointly by the consent of both the spouse as 
per the requirement of section 13(b) of the Act. The petition was kept pendmg 
for six months. On coming to know of the petition, the wife filed objections. 
According to her she never consented to the divorce and the husband had 
duped her into signing some blank paper on a false pretext, which he used in 
the petition. However, some understanding was arrived at, under which the 
wife agreed to join the husband. Both the parties gave a joint statement and 
the divorce petition was got dismissed. Barely three months later, the husband 
filed a divorce petition on several ground. Wife's is application under section 
24 for litigation expenses and maintenance pendente lite, which was granted. 
Since the husband did not make the payments, the divorce proceeding was 
initiated by him were stayed under order of the High Court of Allahabad. The 
wife filed a petition under section 25 for grant of permanent alimony on the 
ground that she was facing starvation whereas the husband was a multi-
millionaire. She also filed a petition under section 24 for maintenance 
pendente lite and litigation expenses. The Additional District Judge allowed 
'^ 1993) 3 s e c 406 
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her petition and granted a sum of Rs. 6,000 as litigation expenses and Rs 
2,000 per month as alimony pendente lite from the date of application. The 
husband filed a revision petition against it in the High Court; the wife also 
approached the court seeking enhancement of the amount. Both the revision 
petitions were referred to a larger Bench. The husband's objection was that 
the wife's application was not maintainable since there was no decree under 
the Act, and in the absence of "any decree" no order under section 24 or 25 of 
the Act could be passed. This objection was sustained whereupon wife filed 
an appeal in the Supreme Court. The issue was whether the words any section 
25 includes an order of dismissal of petition. Reference was made to sexeral 
cases. Some courts held that permanent alimony can be granted only when 
any decree and the relief sought is given, if the relief is not granted then it 
means that there is no decree and in such situation maintenance cannot be 
awarded. On the other hand, there were cases supporting the argument that the 
words "passing any decree" imply both the allowing and dismissal of the 
main petition. After an analysis of the case law, the Supreme Court came to 
the conclusion that the wife's application for maintenance was not 
maintainable as the wife had withdrawn her consent to the divorce petition 
and the same was dismissed. An order of dismissal of a petition does not 
disturb the marriage not confers or takes away any legal character or status. 
According to the court that without the marital status being affected or 
disrupted by the matrimonial court under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the 
claim of permanent alimony was not valid as ancillary or incident to such 
affection or disruption. The wife's claim for maintenance under the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 was dismissed. The court held that the wife's claim in 
such a situation can be agitated under the Hindu adoption and maintenance 
Act, 1956 since section 18(1) if this Act entitles a wife to maintenance even 
with any disruption in her marital status. It observed that like a surgeon, the 
matrimonial court, if operating assumes the obligation of the post operatives 
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and when not leaves the patient to the physician. This judgment is bound to 
create problems for wives whose husband want to get rid of them and fde 
petition which for whatever reasons get dismissed. The dismissal of the 
petition only goes to show that the case of the husband against the wife is 
unfounded. What is the fault of the wife in such case? Secondly while Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act where a wile can seek maintenance even 
without any disruption of her marital status what about woman from other 
communities. They have to bank upon the provision of the Cr.PC. 
In Ashabi B. Takke v. Bashasab Takke'^^, the issue before the Karnataka High 
Court was that whether a wife's refusal to join her husband who has remarried 
sufficient justification for her withdrawal from him and claimmg 
maintenance.The High Court held question of the wife deserting the husband 
or the husband deserting the wife pales into insignificance in the light of this 
development. The fact that the wife could not get maintenance earlier under 
section 125 of Cr.PC proceeding also cannot have any hearing in a suit for 
maintenance file subsequent to the defendant husband having contracted a 
second marriage. This is so even if the personal law of the defendant permits 
him to contract more than one marriage. The second marriage of the husband 
per se is sufficient justification for a wife to leave him and claim 
maintenance. When that is proved, nothing else needs to be established. 
In Bhau Saheb v. Leelabai , there were two main issues which had to be 
settled by the court:(i)Whether an order dismissing a wife's petition seeking 
declaration that her marriage was valid can come under the term "any decree'" 
so as to entitle her to claim maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955. (ii) Whether a wife whose marriage is void, is entitled to 
maintenance. The facts of the case was that shortly after marriage, the wife 
filed criminal case under sections 498A, 323, and 506 of the penal Code 
^''AIR 2003 Kant 172 
• " A I R 2004 Bom .283 (FB) 
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against the husband. She also filed case for maintenance under section 125 of 
the Cr. P.C. this was dismissed by the family court on the ground that she was 
not the legally wedded wife of the opposite party. Meanwhile she filed an 
application before the family court seeking declaration that the marriage was 
valid and the child is legitimate. Along with that she sought maintenance for 
the daughter. Her petition seeking declaration regarding validity of the 
marriage was dismissed by observing that she was not legally wedded wife 
since her husband was an already married man. Maintenance, however, was 
granted in favour of the child. In the backdrop of this legal battle she filed a 
petition under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for permanent 
alimony which was allowed by the family court and the husband was ordered 
to pay Rs. 1,000 per month to the wife w.e.f. the date of application. The 
family court drew support for its order from several judgments. The husband 
appealed against the family court order. He denied solemnization of marriage 
and in the alternative claimed that he was already married on the alleged date 
of marriage with the petitioner and so the marriage if any, was void in view of 
section 5(i) read with section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and so the 
"wife" was not entitled to any maintenance. The court pointed out that 
conduct of the parties and also other circumstances of the case are important 
consideration and they cannot control the discretion conferred upon the court 
by the expression "court may", If there can be cases of denial of maintenance 
to even legally wedded wife the liberal construction of section 25 so as to 
entitle an illegitimate wife to maintenance would not be proper. According to 
the court, it is a fundamental principle of law that in order to claim a relief 
from the court of law, there must be a legal right based on a legal status. 
When status of a woman as wife is not recognized by the provisions of the 
Act which confers the right of permanent alimony, she cannot be entertained 
for grant of relief in the absence of recognition of her status by the Act. If the 
construction of the word "wife" is not accepted uniformly for the same 
remedy provided in special legislation i.e., section 125 of Cr. P.C. and 
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personal law, anomalous position may occur, in personal law. The court 
observed: "Even while considering section 25 to be a '"welfare legislation", it 
cannot be ignored that a liberal construction although may benefit the second 
wives who are drawn into the form of marriage by keeping them ignorant 
about illegitimacy of the same, may encourage bigamous marriage with 
preventing bigamous marriage". Further the court made a distinction between 
a marriage which is void and one which is voidable. The court may consider 
granting of maintenance while declaring the nullity of a voidable marriage as 
the relationship would be legal in law until annulled, but not in case of nullity 
of marriage which is void ipso jure. The wife lost her case. The court held 
that any decree would not mean every decree so as to entitle a wife to claim 
maintenance; and ftirther that wife of a void marriage is not entitled to 
maintenance. That absolving a husband of the liability to maintain his second 
wife who was kept in the dark about the fact of his first marriage would 
encourage, rather than discourage a man to enter into such bigamous 
marriage. A wife would rarely enter into a marriage with an already married 
man with full knowledge of this fact simply because she would not be denied 
maintenance. 
In Geeta Satish Gokarna V. Satish Gokarna''^, the issue before the Court was: 
Can a wife under a consent decree agree to give up to her claim for any 
maintenance in future and would this debar her from claiming an> 
maintenance from her husband thereafter? In the instant case, a marriage was 
dissolved by mutual consent of the parties and as one of the terms of the 
consent decree, the wife agreed not to claim any maintenance/alimony from 
the husband. However, after two years of the decree, she filed an application 
under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for permanent alimony at 
the rate of Rs. 25,000 per month from the date of application. The trial court 
held that the wife's application of maintenance despite the consent clause 
• " • A I R 2004 Bom. 345 
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where under it was agreed that "the petitioner [wife] will not clahn an> 
maintenance or alimony in future from the respondent [husbandT". 
Accordingly, it ordered the husbaad to pay Rs. 2,000 per month as 
maintenance to the wife. Both the parties appealed - the wife against the 
quantum and the husband against the very maintainability of the wife's claim. 
The appeals were dismissed. The High Court found no material on record 
which could justify enhancement of the amount in favour of the wife, and as 
to the husband's objection, it held that the power to grant maintenance has 
been conferred on the court by parliament under the Act and the parties 
cannot, by agreement, oust the court's jurisdiction. The court further stated 
that permanent alimony and maintenance are a larger part of the right to life. 
These provisions according to the court are included "to enable a person 
unable to maintain herself (or himself) to be protected. Therefore, any clause 
in a contract or consent terms providing to the contrary would be against 
public policy". The principle is that where on grounds of public policy, wife 
cannot enter into such contract then the contract is void and the court will take 
no notice of that and ignore that part of the order though it was made by 
consent because as remarked by Lord Atkin 'the wife right to future 
maintenance is matter of public concern which she carmot barter away." An 
agreement in a consent decree not to claim maintenance cannot close the 
doors for a wife's claim of maintenance thereafter. Maintenance has been 
construed as an integral part of right to life. The decision is good as it cannot 
be denied that maintenance is an integral part of right to life; one really 
wonders whether it is fair to allow a consenting party to retract. The view 
taken by the court has the potential of discouraging mutual settlement of 
issues and consent divorce since consent agreements are package where 
parties agree to barter certain rights and claim to buy peace. If term and 
conditions of the consent agreement are fair and reasonable the courts should 
honour such agreement and discourage retraction. 
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In Surendra Kumar Bhansali v. Judge, Family Court'*^, the issue was whether 
an apphcation under section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
maintainable while an appeal against divorce is pending. High Court held that 
an application, under section 25 can be made of passing of the decree or at 
any time subsequent thereto. In this case, since the divorce petition b\ the 
husband was decreed and the marriage dissolved, the wife's application was 
held to be tenable. According to the court, the relief could have been refused 
if the main petition had been dismissed as per the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharla Dhawan^, but not simply because an 
appeal against the divorce decree was pending. The decision is right which 
declares that an appeal against a decree of divorce does not disentitle a part> 
from filing an application for maintenance under section 25 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955. Such application, in terms of the provision of section 25. 
can be filed at the time of the passing of the decree or at any time subsequent 
thereto. An appeal against the decree does not take away this right. 
In Sudha Suhas Nandanvankar v. Suhas Ramrao Nandanvankar , the issue 
was: Can a wife whose conduct demonstration that she is trying to take 
advantage of her own wrong or fraud to harass the husband. The parties were 
married in 1995 according to Hindu rites. The marriage was annulled by a 
decree of nullity in 1996 on the ground that the wife was suffering from 
epilepsy at the time of marriage which fact was not disclosed to the husband 
and hence a fraud was committed on him [prior to the Marriage Laws 
(Amendment) Act, 1999 epilepsy was a ground on which a marriage could be 
avoided and decree obtained under secfion 11, coupled with section 5(ii) (c) 
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The word epilepsy in section (c) of section 
(5(ii) has now been deleted.] Even though the decree was ex parte, it was not 
challenged by the wife. However, after the decree the wife first claimed return 
""' AIR 2004 Raj 257 
'"1993 3 s e c 406 
" A I R 2005 Bom 62 
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of articles which were presented to her by her parents at the time of marriage. 
Further, she claimed expenses incurred at the marriage. During pendency of 
this application she again submitted application for articles and jcwelr\ 
presented to her by her in-laws at the time of marriage. She further claimed 
permanent alimony. The wife's application was partly allowed by the family 
court. Hence, she files an appeal in respect of part rejection of her application. 
The main issue for consideration was in respect of alimony claimed by her. 
The court of nullity conceded that a wife is entitled to claim alimony even 
though a decree of nullity is passed at the instance of the applicant. This. 
however, according to the court is not an absolute right. If a wife's conduct is 
such that the court feels that she should not be granted maintenance, the court 
may refuse her application. In this case, according to the court the non-
disclosure by the parents of the appellant and the appellant's accepting the 
decree as it is, without making any grudge in respect of the ground that the 
appellant was suffering from epilepsy prior to the marriage reflects upon the 
conduct of the applicant, and if we take into consideration this aspect what we 
find is that the appellant is trying to take advantage of her wrong or fraud and 
is trying to harass the respondent by claiming the amount of alimony". And 
further, the court held "What we find is that after a decree of annulment, the 
respondent has married and he is having a child. Now this appears to be an 
attempt on the part of the appellant and her parents to disturb the marital life 
of the respondent which he has tried to settle after annulment of the marriage. 
This is an attempt to shift the liability of maintenance by the appellant wife on 
a husband who was not fault and who has not consummated the marriage. 
Even though the law permits the right of alimony in favour of the appellant, 
however, the conduct and circumstances involved in the present case does not 
permit us to pass an order of permanent nature in favour of the appellant". 
The wife's appeal was, thus, dismissed. 
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Now some cases relating to the section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and 
maintenance Act, 1956, will be discussed. In Ran]it Kumar Bhattacharya v. 
Sabita Bhattacharya^^, the issue before the Court was: Is a married woman 
who lived with a married man as his wife, entitled to damages because she. 
not being a legal wife is not entitled to maintenance? Facts of the case were 
that a married man lived with a woman for several years including her to 
believe that she was his wife, and also had children from her. Later they fell 
apart. The woman filed a suit for maintenance under the Hindu Adoption and 
Mainteance Act, 1956, and also under section 125 of Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1973. The man denied marriage and his liability to maintain her The 
additional District and session judge held that in view of long and continuous 
co-habitation between the parties, there was a strong presumption of marriage 
and that mere absence of proof regarding marriage rites could not dislodge the 
presumption unless there was proof of in surmountable obstacles to a valid 
marriage. A decree of maintenance for Rs. 500 per month was passed. Hence, 
husband appeal. It was argued that section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and 
Maintenance Act, 1956, makes no provision for maintenance from a 'husband' 
with whom a woman has entered into a void marriage. The Contention was 
accepted by the court and it was held that the woman was not entitled to 
maintenance. The Court, however, ordered the man to pay damages. 
According to the court, it is obvious that the man must have induced her to 
believe that she is his wife: for such immoral activities, the applicant should 
not be spared altogether, though the damage that had been caused, both 
physically and mentally, could not be compensated in any way," the court 
remarked. He was, accordingly, directed to pay Rs.30000 by way of damages. 
This case is yet another example of how a woman can be defrauded and 
entrapped into a relationship and the man can just get away because under the 
law they are not husband and wife. There is a need for a law which should 
''A.I.R., 1996 Cal. 301 
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impose liability on such erring males who defraud women into a legalh void 
marriage only to abandon them later and then take advantage of their own 
illegal/immoral act. As rightly remarked by the court on this case, no amount 
of damage can compensate the damage caused to the woman. 
In Bouramma v. Siddappa Jeevappa Pataracf^, the main issue was 
whether"an arrangement to live separately" be treated as a "divorce deed'". 
The facts of the case were that a wife filed an application for maintenance 
under section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Actl956. The 
parties were married in 1966 and the claim was made by the wife in 1995. She 
claimed past maintenance also. She pleaded desertion and alleged that the 
husband had another wife and they both ill treated her and threw her out of 
the house. The husband resisted the application on the ground that their 
marriage had been dissolved by consent as per "an arrangement to live 
separately", and in terms of the provision of section 18 of the Hindu 
Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, a claim for maintenance can be made 
only when their is subsisting marriage. The trial court held that there \\as no 
maintenance under the provisions of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance 
Act. Hence the wife appeals. It was held by the court that the second marriage 
by itself is desertion of the wife and that fact having been proved; no further 
proof of desertion was required. Besides, "an arrangement to live separately". 
even assuming that it is proved, could not have the effect of bringing the 
marriage to an end. Such agreement was, allegedly, entered into long after the 
enactment of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. According to the court "a 
marriage in law can be dissolved only by a, method recognized in law and not 
otherwise". The so-called arrangement sought to be passed off as a divorce-
deed" could not, firstly, be treated as a divorce, and secondly, after the 
coming into force of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, a marriage could be 
dissolved only under the provisions of the Act, of exceptionally, under custom 
" A I R 2003 Kant 342 
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permitting divorce. In this case there was no assertion by the husband that 
there was a divorce under a customs prevalent in the community to which 
they belonged. The marriage was thus held to be subsisting and the wife's 
claim tenable and bona fide. She was, however, not entitled to past 
maintenance but only to maintenance with effect the cast of her application. 
In Sheela Rani v. Jagdish Chander Sharma^'', It was held that the right of 
residence as part of maintenance is a personal right of the wife. 
(c) Identification of Pitfalls 
The Hindu marriage Act, 1955 is a social welfare legislation. It was with this 
end certain rights were conferred on Hindu women by the Act. Therefore, 
such a piece of legislation should be constructed by adopting progressive and 
liberal approach and not a narrow and pedantic approach. However, there is 
some judicial pronouncement which shows the strict behaviour of Judiciar> 
toward the aggrieved spouse. In the matter of implementing the provisions of 
Act, the technicalities of the provision must be left to some extent. This \iew 
was adopted by the High Court of Calcutta in Sisir Kumar v. Sabita Rani 
"The word 'Wife' or 'Husband' in section 25, has been used as 
convenient terms to refer to the parties to a marriage whether or not the 
marriage was valid or subsisting. Marriage had been used to include a 
purported marriage which was void ab initio". 
Here it is also a noteworthy fact which was discussed in Amit Kumar Sharma 
V. Vi Add. District Session Judge Bijnor that whether a wife can also seek 
maintenance for husband's mother who need to be taken care of under the 
same application for maintenance under section-25 when mother is staying 
with her? Here court has taken a very rigid and technical view and ordered the 
'"AIR 2004 Del 158 
" A I R 1972 Cal. 
'"AIR 1999 All 
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old mother to file separate claim under Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or 
under section 20 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. While 
awarding the maintenance in an application the court must consider, inter 
alia, the needs of the applicant. When the husband's mother is staying with 
the estranged wife, the court should have given consideration to those needs 
rather than driving her (the mother) to file separate suits for maintenance 
under Cr. P.C or the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1955. 
The another pitfall which may be noticed is that in some cases the husband 
has tried to be absolved of the liability to pay the arrears of interim 
maintenance to the wife after allowing dismissal of the main petition under 
the Act, e.g. in Lataben Y, Goswami v. S. Goswami ,that has been discussed 
earlier in this project. Here the court noticed the husband's trick and wife was 
found entitled to the arrears. The husband was not allowed to defeat the claim 
of wife to the arrears of maintenance by simply or not proceeding with the 
main petition. 
Another point of discussion regarding the identification as pitfalls in the 
CO 
application of the provisions of Hindu law is m Ramesh babu v. Usha'. In the 
instant case, the husband denied the maintenance of wife on the ground that 
the wife is entitled to free legal aid The Court refused the argument of 
husband and awarded maintenance to wife. The court caught the trick of 
husband and gave relief to wife. 
In some cases the husband contended against the maintainability of wife's 
claim of maintenance under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on the ground that 
wife gave up her claim under consent decree for maintenance in future, e.g. in 
Geeta Satish Gokarna v. Satish Gokarna^^. This case came before Bombay 
High Court, the court, however, refused to accept the husband's argument and 
" A I R 1999 Guj) 
^ ' A I R 2003 Mad. 
" A I R 2004 Bom. 345 
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held that "An agreement in consent decree not to claim maintenance cannot 
close the doors for a wife to maintenance thereafter". 
The other loophole in the Act is that there is no legislative provision regarding 
maintenances to the place of filing of petition or jurisdiction of court.In the 
absence of the specific provision regarding this matter the provisions of CPC 
is applied, In Sucha Dilip Ghate v. Dilip Shanta Ram Ghate'^", the issue was: 
can a maintenance petition by wife under the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act, 1956 be filed at a place where wife resides. Here section 20 
(c) of CPC was applied and was held where petitioner resides. 
In Popri Bat v. Teerath Singh^' 
We see that this case was explicit example of how unscrupulous husbands try 
to harras their wives and use the process of court for achieving this. The court 
noting the tricks of the husband with regard to the alimony pendente lite 
under secfion-18 of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,1956,ordered the 
maintenance from the date of application and not from the date of the 
order.Thus , there is some pitfalls in the Hindu Law regarding the 
maintenance of wife which have already been pointed out . As the 
maintenance of the women is a very sensitive issue, so, it must be handled in 
a careful manner,it must be paid sharing the due regard to the intention of the 
the legislature. 
(d) Advocacy for Reforms and Improvements 
It is a well known fact that Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is social welfare 
legislation. The judiciary must always while interpreting its provision, keep in 
consideration its social welfare nature. A liberal approach must be adopted in 
the interpretation of its provisions. 
''"AIR 2003 Bom.390 
'•'AIR 2004 Raj. 128 
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It is also necessary that the tricks of the spouses, for avoiding the charge to 
maintenance must be noticed timely so as to implement the Act sharing the 
true intention of legislature for its enactment. 
Right of a wife to maintenance where a marriage is void had always been 
controversial. An amendment in law is in offing where the simple fact of the 
parties having gone through a ceremony of marriage would be enough to 
entitle the wife to maintenance. 
It is also a remarkable point that a subjective approach in order to avoid the 
grant of relief must not be allowed by a court . The denial of maintenance 
under section-25 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was due to the concealment of 
her epilepsy by the wife before marriage on the already obtained 
annulment.Here I am not justifying "wrong" , "misconduct" or "fraud" on the 
part of any spouse but only indicating how subjective approach can lead to 
varying interpretations in order to deny or granting a relief . Bakul bai v. 
Ganga ram^^ case the fraud is serious but the victim is the wife only . Thus 
the court, while deciding this type of matrimonial case ,must always take into 
consideration that the aim of the enactment should not be frustrated .To avoid 
the confusion regarding the maintenance as has been discussed in Geeta 
Satish Gokarna v. Satish Gokarna '^ ,there must be insertion of the provision 
by the legislature regarding the nullification of consent agreement not to 
claim maintenance in future as the maintenance has been construed as an 
integral part of right to life. 
The Hindu Law is a social welfare legislation and beneficial in nature, it has 
been enacted in comprehensive manner so, it would be unfair not to have the 
specific provision regarding the place of filling of petition or jurisdiction of 
''^Sudha Suhas Nandan Vankar v. Sithas Ramrao Nandan Vankar AIR 2005 Bom 
" 1988 1 scale 188 
'^ AIR 2004 Bom. 345 
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the court. There must be some specific provision regarding that to face the 
problem raised in Sucheta Dilip Ghate v. Dilip Shanta Ram Ghate '^ Ihe 
insertion of the specific provision regarding the place of filing suit will cause 
the great help in avoiding confusion and will reduce the delay in deciding 
cases. 
''^ AIR 2003 Bom. 390. 
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PART B 
INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation the 'Part B' consists the chapter 1 which deals with the 
'Maintenance of wife under Muslim Law'. Similar to 'Part A' ,this "Part B' 
has also been discussed under the following headings: (a) Analysis of the 
legislative provisions (b) Evaluation of the judicial pronouncements (c) 
Identification of pitfalls (d)Advocacy of reforms and improvements. It, 
primarily, deals with the responsibility of the Muslim husband to maintain his 
wife in the form of Kharch-i-pandan . After this the controvercy between the 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 and Muslim Personal Law regarding the 
maintenance of Muslim divorcee has been discussed . The agitation of the 
Muslim community due to the controversial judgment of the Shah Bano 's 
case which paved the way to the enactment of the Muslim Women ( 
Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 has also been analyzed under this 
heading. The 'Evaluation of the judicial pronouncements' deals with the 
evaluation of the decisions of the various High Courts and Hon'ble Supreme 
Court regarding the maintenance of Muslim divorcee . The evaluation of the 
cases and judicial pronouncements describe the judicial scenario before and 
after the Shah Bano's judgment. This heading also deals with the cause of the 
enactment of the Muslim Women ( Protection of Rights on Divorce) 
Act,1986, and the role of judiciary towards the application of the provisions 
of this enactment. The reasons have also been mentioned as to wh> the 
judiciary is sometimes blamed for promoting the application of the provisions 
of Cr.P.C,rather the provisions of this enactment regarding the maintenance 
of Muslim divorcee through the sufficient case laws. Further, this part in the 
identification of pitfalls shows some loopeholes in the hurry and rash drafting 
of the Muslim Women ( Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 . These 
loopeholes may be blamed to allow the judiciary to distort some intactablc 
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rules of Muslim Law regarding the maintenance of Muslim divorcee in the 
guise of the judicial activism which can't be said a proper way for the 
intrusion in the personal law of any community. Lastly, this part which is the 
'advocacy of reforms and improvements', covers some humble suggestions 
regarding the reformation of some provisions of the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 , as this Act has the heav\ 
responsibility to represent manifestly the Islamic Community to the whole 
world. 
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CHAPTER! 
MAINTENANCE OF WIFE UNDER MUSLIM LAW 
(a) Analysis of legislative Provision 
The rules regarding the maintenance of Muslim wife has been given in 
Sharia. According to the ordinary sequence of natural events, the wife comes 
first. Her right of maintenance is absolute. Her right remains unprejudiced 
even if she has property or income of her own and the husband is poor. A 
husband is bound to maintain his wife, irrespective of being a Muslim, non-
Muslim, poor or rich, young or old if not young to be unfit for matrimonial 
intercourse. In addition to the legal obligation to maintain, there may be 
stipulations in the marriage contract which may render the husband liable to 
make a special allowance to the wife. Such allowances are called kharch-i-
pandan, guzara, mewa-khori, etc. The husband is bound to maintain if she 
fulfils the following conditions:(i)She has attained puberty, i.e., an age at 
which she can render to the husband for his conjugal rights;(ii)She places and 
offers to place herself in his power so as to allow free access to herself at all 
lawful times and obeys all his lawful commands. It is to be noted that a 
Muslim wife is not entitled to maintenance in certain conditions.These 
conditions are: (i)If she abandons the conjugal domicile without any valid 
cause;(ii)If she refuses access to her husband without and valid cause;(iii)Il 
she disobedient to his reasonable commands;(iv)If she refuse to live with her 
husband without any lawful excuse;(v)If she has been imprisoned;(vi)If she 
has eloped with somebody;(vii)If she is a minor on which account marriage 
cannot be consummated.(viii)If she deserts her husband voluntarily and does 
not perform her marital duties,and(ix)If she makes an agreement of desertion 
on the second marriage of her husband. 
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The wife's right to maintenance ceases on the death of her husband, as in this 
condition her right of inheritance supervenes. The widow is, therefore, not 
entitled to maintenance during the Iddat of death. But under MusHm Law, a 
divorce wife is entitled to be maintained by her former husband during the 
period of Iddat. 
Now after discussing the maintenance of Muslim wife during the subsistence 
of marriage, It is planned to discuss the maintenance of Muslim divorcee and 
controversy between the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and the 
Muslim Personal Law on the point of maintenance of Muslim divorcee. It is 
pertinent to note that under classical Islamic law, a divorcee is entitled to get 
the maintenance provision but the same will continue till the expir>' of the 
period of iddat. There is controversy between the classical rules of Islamic 
Law and provisions of Criminal Procedure Code regarding maintenance. The 
controversy arose when British India took a legislative step to regulate the 
institution of maintenance of wife, under section 488 of the old Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1898, the husband might be compelled to make a monthly 
allowance not exceeding Rs. 500 per month as maintenance to his wife. Hut 
the wife's right to maintenance under this section could be defeat by the 
husband by obtaining the divorce under the personal law. The provision under 
section 488 of the old Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was very much in the 
line with the sprit of Islamic law, where it furnished a speedy remedy for 
securing maintenance to all Indian wives neglected by their husband on 
certain grounds including bigamy. In several cases the separate maintenance 
orders were granted in favour of the wives, but in many cases where a 
maintenance order under section 488 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 were 
granted to Muslim wife, her husband subsequently divorced her by Talaq. 
consequently the maintenance order so granted ceased to be effective after the 
expiry of Iddat period as per the rules of Muslim law.This situation caused 
hardship and opened the gate for a long battled between the shariah on one 
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side, Criminal Procedure and the Indian courts on the other. To remove 
conflict, the joint committee recommended that the benefit of the provisions 
should be extended to a woman who has been divorced by her husband and it 
should continue so long as she has not been remarried after the divorce. 
Accordingly, the uniform law of maintenance was introduced to all citizens of 
India through the amendment in criminal procedure code in 1973. 
Accordingly, clause (b) of explanation to section 125(1) was enacted, which 
laid down that for the purpose of maintenance "wife" includes a woman who 
has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not 
remarried, however, section 127 (3)(b) was added to provide protection to 
Muslims and Muslim Personal laws. This code under chapter IX, provides a 
uniform law of maintenance through the amendment in Criminal Procedure 
Code in 1973 the uniform law of maintenance was introduced to all citizens 
of India. The definition of wife as given in explanation of section 125 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is noteworthy for the purpose of analysis: 
"Wife includes a woman who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce 
from her husband and she has not remarried". This definition of the wife was 
objectionable to the scholars to the Islamic matrimonial jurisprudence as the 
same was foreign to the Islamic concept of wife and Indian Muslim resented 
and thus their resentment was duly recognized. This definition of wife laid 
down by the legal fiction on the basis of which the two strangers being of 
opposite sex (after the divorce on the expiry of Iddat period) are treated to be 
the husband and wife under section 125 of the Cr. P.C. for the purposes of 
maintenance even after divorce. When the bill to this effect was in process it 
was subjected to tooth and nail opposition by Muslim members in the 
legislative house viz, Ibrahim Sulaiman seth, G.M. Banat wala, and others. 
They objected the explanatory clause defining the term 'wife' and they 
advanced potent advocacy that the Muslim must be exempted from the ambit 
of the definition of wife, but the strong defense of the then law minister and 
minority of opposition including Muslim members came in the way and 
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resultantly could not achieve the desired goal. The law minister painted out 
that the explanation in section 125,of the Cr.P.C. did not affect the civil status 
of husband and wife and manner and besides this, made the following 
observation: "we have received a lot of representations which show that alter 
divorce, woman are generally in very bad plight and it is a very difficult 
social and humanitarian problem I do not think that Muslim 
Personal Law comes into the problem". However, the advocacy of law 
minister and other supporter's plea could not satisfy, and a proposed 
modification was vehemently opposed by the numerous section of Muslims. 
The definition of the wife was objected by the scholars Islamic matrimonial 
jurisprudence as the same is foreign to Islamic concept of wife and Indian 
Muslim resented and thus their resentment was duly recognized, Resultantly, 
section 127 (3)(b) was added to satisfy the Muslim community's resentment 
and the same was desired to work as exception, this empowers the Magistrate 
to cancel the order to maintenance passed under section 125 of the code. If the 
divorce women has received whether before or after the date of the said order, 
the whole or the sum which was payable under customary or personal law 
applicable to parties .The Provision for maintenance of wives,whether 
married or divorced, who are unable to maintain themselves is a social 
welfare measure applicable to all people irrespective of caste, creed, 
community or nationality^^. 
In Bai Tahird'% case, the supreme Court did not turn to the Holy Quran but 
confined itself to section 125 considering it as a secular provision and came to 
the conclusion that the claim of maintenance by the divorcee was indefeasible 
be the husband Hindu, Muslim or others, so long as the spouse had not 
'^ See for detail, Mohammad Shabbir, Muslim Personal Law and Judiciary (Ed. I", 1988, Allahabad). 
" Bai Tahira Vs. Ali Husain, AIR 1979, SC 362. 
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remarried and had no means to maintain herself. The very next year the court 
re-inforced its earUer decision in Fuzlunbi 's case in the following words: 
"Whatever be the facts of a particular case, the Criminal Procedure Code by 
enacting section 125 to 127, charges the court with the humane obligation of 
enforcing maintenance or its just equivalent to ill used wives and the castaway 
ex-wives, only if the woman has not receive voluntarily a sum at the time of 
divorce, sufficient to keep her going according to the circumstances of the 
parties". 
Section 127 ( 3)(b) of Criminal Procedure Code lays down that "Where any 
order has been made under section 125 in favour of a woman who has been 
divorced by or has obtained a divorce from her husband, the Magistrate shall 
cancel such order of maintenance if he is satisfied that the divorced woman 
has received the whole of the sum whether before or after the date of such 
order under the personal law applicable to the parties. 
The position as finally enacted laid down that through court could grant 
maintenance to a divorced wife, at the time of so doing, they should give due 
consideration as to whether she had already realized from her husband in full, 
her post divorce entitlement under any customary or the personal law of the 
parties. 
The persual of the legislative history of section-127 (3) (b)made it clear that 
this provision was brought to provide to safeguard to Muslims and their 
persons law. It empowers the magistrate to cancel the order section 125 of 
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 if the divorced women who has received 
whether before or after the date of said order the whole of sum which was 
payable under any customary or personal law applicable to those parties. Mr. 
Justice Krishna Iyer further states: "Neither personal law nor other 
salvationary plea will hold against the policy of public law pervading section 
'•' Fuzlunbi Vs. Kader Vali, AIR 1980, SC 1730. 
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127 (3) (b) as much as it does section 125. So a farthing is not substitute for a 
fortune nor naive consent equivalent to intelligent acceptance". Thus the 
impact of sections 125-127 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, on the 
maintenance rights of Muslim ex-wives has been the subject of interpretation 
through Indian judiciary. The ruling laid down in Bat Tahira's case and 
Fuzlunbi 's case, and their objectionability to Muslims are well known and to 
get the desired result in 1981. The Supreme Court was asked to reconsider 
these ruling in Mohd Ahamd Khan Vs Shah Bano Begum . However it added 
fuel to the fire by laying down: "Although the limits of the Muslim Husband's 
liability to prove for maintenance of the divorced wife is up to the period of 
Iddat it does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by 
section 125 of the code, it would be incorrect and unjust to extent the above 
principle of Muslim law cases in which the divorced wife is able to maintain 
herself. The husband liability ceases with the expiration of period of Iddat. 
But if she is unable to maintain herself after the period oi Iddat she is entitled 
to have recourse to section 125 of the Code". 
But chief Justice of Supreme Court Mr. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud going for 
beyond Mr. Justice Iyer's thinking intruded into Muslim Personal Law saying 
the said special provision of the code totally ineffective. Two points mainly 
alarmed the Muslim of such judgment:F/r5/ the Alleged attempt of the judge 
to "reinterpret" certain Quamic verses and Second admonition to the state in 
respect of the uniform civil code. 
As a result religious sentiments of Muslim were not only injured by the 
wording and purport of the Shah Bano's judgment, but also much more b)' its 
projection on an anti - Islamic law ruling of the highest court of justice in the 
country. There upon Muslim organizations and individuals under the 
leadership of the All India Muslim Personal law Board started a country wide 
' • ' A I R 1985, S C 945. 
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agitation and caused the majority of Muslim citizen in India to demand 
statutory protection of their personal law. 
Some relevant provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 regarding Maintenance of Muslim Divorce are in need of 
separate treatment. Section 3(l)(a) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986 lays down that a divorced Muslim wife shall be 
entitled to a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and 
paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband. Section 3(l)(b) of 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, lays down the 
condition where divorced Muslim wife herself maintains the children born to 
her before or after her divorce. In this condition she will be entitled to a 
reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid b} her 
fornier husband for a period of two years from the respective dates of birth of 
such children. Section 3(1 )(c) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 lays down that a Muslim divorced wife shall be entitled to 
an amount equal to the sum of Mahr or dower agreed to be paid to her at the 
time of her marriage or at any time thereafter according to Muslim law. 
Section 3(l)(d) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 
1986 lays down a Muslim divorcee will be entitled to all the properties given 
to her before or at the time of marriage or after the marriage by her relatives 
or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends. 
Section 3(2) of this act lays down that where a reasonable and fair provision 
and maintenance or the amount of Mahr or dower due has not been or made 
or paid or the properties referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1) have not 
been delivered to a divorced woman on her divorce, she or any one duly 
authorized by her may, on her behalf, make an application to a Magistrate for 
an order for payment of such provision and maintenance, Mahr or dower or 
the delivery of properties, as the case may be. 
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Section 4 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
deals with the rules as to order for payment of maintenance. Subsection (1) of 
this section lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in the forgoing 
provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. 
1986, or in any other law for the time being in force, where the Magistrate is 
satisfied that a divorced woman has not re-married and is not able to maintain 
herself after the Iddat period, he may make an order directing such of her 
relatives as would be entitled to inherit her property on her death according to 
Muslim law to pay reasonable and fair maintenance to her as he determine fit 
and proper, having regard to the needs of the divorced woman, the standard of 
life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of such relatives and 
such maintenance shall be payable by such relatives in the proportions in 
which they would inherit her property and at period as he may specify in his 
order. There is a proviso in this section which provides that where such 
divorced woman has children, the Magistrate shall order only such children to 
pay maintenance to her, and the event of any such children being unable to 
pay such maintenance; the magistrate shall order the parents of such divorced 
woman to pay maintenance to her. The second proviso of this section 
provides further that if any of the parents is unable to pay his or share of the 
maintenance ordered by the Magistrate on the ground of his or not having the 
means to pay the same the Magistrate may, on proof of such inability being 
furnished to him, order that the share of such relatives in the maintenance 
order by him be paid by such of the order relatives as may appear to the 
Magistrate to have the means of paying the same in such proportion as the 
Magistrate may think fit to order. Subsection 2 of this section lays down that 
where divorced woman is unable to maintain herself and she has no relatives 
as mentioned subsection (1) or such relatives or any one of them have not 
enough means to pay the maintenance ordered by the magistrate or the other 
relatives have not the means to pay shares of those relatives whose shares 
have been ordered by the magistrate to be paid by such other relatives under 
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the proviso to sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, by order direct the State 
Wakf Board established under section 9 of the Wakf Act (29 of 1954), or 
under any other law for the time being in force in a State, functioning in the 
area in which the woman resides, to pay such maintenance as determined by 
the under sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, to pay the shares of such of 
the relatives who are unable to pay, at such periods as he may specif) in his 
order. 
Section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, 
gives the option to divorced Muslim wife to be governed by the provisions of 
section 125 to section 128 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, but the 
condition is that there must be an agreement between the husband and wife by 
an affidavit, that they would prefer to be governed by the provisions of 
section 125 to section-128 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. It is also 
necessary that the declare must be made on the date of the first hearing. The 
explanation of this section says that for the purpose of this section, ''date of 
the first hearing of the application" means the date fixed in the summons for 
the attendance of the respondent to the application. 
Section 7 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, 
is the transitional position which lays down that every application by a 
divorced woman under section 125 or under section 127 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code , 1973 (2 of 1974), pending before a Magistrate or the 
commencement of this Act, shall, notwithstanding anything contained in that 
code and subject to the provisions of section 5 of this Act, be disposed of by 
such magistrate in accordance with the provisions of this Act. 
(c) Evaluation of judicial pronouncements 
The judicial attitude towards the application of maintenance provisions to Muslim 
wives and divorcee has created a crisis. The interpretation of section 125 and 127 
(3) (b) of the code as applicable to Muslim has been considered by the Supreme 
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Court and High Courts but the decision are some how opposed to the Spirit of 
Islamic Law. The courts have dealt with the following issues from time to time. 
1. Whether section 125 of the code is violative of Articles 14 and 19. offends 
the fundamental rights under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution ' 
2. Whether the definition of the wife envisaged in explanation (b) ol" section 
125 (1) of the code is in conflict with the personal law of Muslims of 
India? 
3. Whether a Muslim divorce can seek the benefit of section 125 of the code? 
4. Whether the payment of Mahr by a Muslim satisfied the requirements of 
section 127 (3) (b) and obliged the Magistrate to cancel a maintenance 
order made in favour of a Muslim divorcee? The Criminal Procedure Code, 
1973 provides a uniforms law of maintenance. The new provisions enjoin 
payment of maintenance to divorce till their remarriage of death. It imports 
to create an artificial relation of husband and wife only for the purpose of 
maintenance after divorce . Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 
1973 by means of an explanation sought to extend the magisterial power to 
provide for maintenance of an ex-wife also. 
However, an exception in the form of section 127 (3) (b), this empowers a 
magistrate to cancel the order of maintenance made under section 125 of the code, 
if the divorced women has received, whether before or after the date of the said 
order, the whole of the sum which under any customary of personal law 
applicable to the parties was payable'''. 
Where any order has been made under section 125 of Cr. P.C, in favour of a 
women who has been divorced by or has obtained a divorce from or her husband, 
the magistrate shall if he is satisfied that the women has been divorced by her 
™ See Chapter 9 of the new code - 1973. 
"See 127 93)(b)oftheCr. P.C. 
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husband and that she has received, whether before or after the date of order, the 
whole of the sum which under any customary or personal law applicable to the 
parties, was payable on such divorce. 
Under the new code ,the questions arise:-
1. Whether a Muslim divorce can seek to the benefits of section 125"' 
2. What is the 'sum due' from the husband to the wife on divorce under the 
Muslim law? 
3. If the husband paid the whole of sum is there any justification in refusing 
the benefits conferred by section 127 (3) (b)? 
In 1976, the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Kunhi Moyin Case " held 
that under the new code the Muslim divorced wife is entitled for maintenance 
under section 125 of the new code after the Iddat period. In U.A. Khan ^ the 
Kamataka High Court observed that the maintenance for some additional period 
beyond the period of Iddat becomes available to divorced Muslim women under 
section 125 of the code. This additional benefit does not at all in the conflict with 
the right she has under the Mohammaden Law. 
For the first time in Kunhi Moyin's case, the division of bench of Kerala High 
Court has held that the payment of maintenance during 'Iddat' or the payment of 
Mahr will not exonerate the Muslim Husband from the liability towards the 
divorced wife under section 125. Justice Khalid speaking on behalf of division 
Bench gave the social purpose of legislation and observed: 
"The new definition (of wife) does not violate the fundamental rights guaranteed 
under article 25 (1) of the constitution. The definition of section 125 (1) comes 
with the expression "providing for social welfare and reform", legislation 
contained in Art 25 (2) of the constitutions, and hence the challenge of Articles 25 
''- Kunhi Moyin v. Pathamma, (1976) KLT 92, 1976 MLJ (Criminal) 405. 
" U.A. Khan v. Mahboobaunnisa (1976) Cr.L. 395. 
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is not available for the petitioner. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 transcends 
the personal law of the parties". 
1. The Constitution is openly and determinedly secular. Religious 
discrimination on the part of the state is forbidden '^*. Freedom of Religion 
is guaranteed'^. Dr. Ambedkar in the constituent Assembly had expressed 
his awareness of the situation that would crop out in the field of social 
welfare legislation and social welfare programs of a government. 
In Iqbal Ahamd Khan Case'^. The Allahabad High Court held that section 125 of 
the code is not repugnant to Article 25 of the constitution. The court further 
observed that the history of applicability of Muslim law shows that the payment 
or non-payment of maintenance to one's wife could never be regarded as a matter 
of personal law. 
In Isac Chandra Palker Case'', the division bench of the Bombay High Court 
held that the maintenance right conferred upon the divorcee even after the Iddat 
period, under section 125, is additional and independent right. The provisions of 
the Shariat Application Act ,1937and section 125 of the Cr.P.C. can stand 
together as there is no inconsistency between them. 
no 
Justice R.K. Shukla of Allahabad High Court in Mohd Yameen Case , observed 
that section 125 is applicable and enforceable whatever may be the personal law 
of parties. Thus Kerala, Bombay, Calcutta and Kamatka High Court have taken 
the view that the Muslim Divorcees are entitled to the maintenance under section 
125 of the code even after the Iddat period. However, later Bombay, Andra 
Pradesh and Full bench of Kerala High Court have taken a contrary view holding 
that if the husband satisfied the magistrate in proceedings under section 125 of the 
'^  Article 15, 16, 29 (2), 30 (2) of the Indian Constitution. 
" Article 25, 26, 28, 29 and 30 (1) of the Indian Constitution. 
'" I. A. Khan v. State of UP 1980, Cr. L J (80 NOC) All 34. 
^^  Isac Chandra Palker v. Nayamat Bi (1980) Cr. L.J 1180. 
™ Mohd Yameen v. Shamim Bano (1984) Cr. L J 1297. 
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code, that he has complied with requirements of section 127 (3) (b), the divorced 
wife does not have any subsisting right of maintenance. 
The Supreme Court of India in case of Bai-Tahira v. Ali Hussain^^ found itself in 
dilemma at the time of interpreting sections, of Criminal Procedure Code. 1973. 
The fact of the case are enumerated as follows:-
The respondent Ali Hussain (Husband) married the appellant Tahira (Wife) as a 
second wife, way back in 1956, and after few years had a son by her. 
The initial warmth vanished and jealous is of triangular situation erupted marrying 
mutual affection. The respondent divorced the appellant around July 1962. 
A suit relating to a flat in which the husband had housed the wife resulted in a 
consent decree, which also settled the marital dispute. For instance is recited that 
the respondent had transferred the suit premises, namely a flat in Bombay to the 
appellant and also the shares of the cooperatives housing society, which built that 
flat. The amount of Mahr (money Rs. 5000/-) and maintenance of Iddat period 
was also paid to the appellant. 
The plaintiff declares that she has no claim or rights what so ever against the 
defendant or against states or properties of the defendant . 
Q 1 
After the enforcement of code wife made a claim for maintenance from her 
husband under the section. 
In the instant case, supreme court surprisingly ignored the express legislative 
intention and connected the amount of dower payable at the time of divorce under 
the personal law with the amount of maintenance which accordingly to the court 
must sufficient to maintain the divorced women. 
^^AIR 1979 SC 362. 
'" l27(3)(b)ofCr. P.C. 
" See Section 125 of Cr. P.C. 
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The Apex Court Bench, consisting of Justice Tulza Pulkar and Justice Pathak 
honoured the appeal of Bat Tahira's maintenance and on behalf o\' the court 
justice Krishna Iyer observed the following. 
He further says: The payment of illusory amount by way of customary or personal 
laws requirement will be considered in the reduction of maintenance state but can 
not annihilate unless it is reasonable substitution. The observation of the Supreme 
Court has amended some words in section 127 (3) (b) giving meaning t it that the 
magistrate is empowered to cancel such order on the satisfaction that such whole 
of the sum is sufficient to do the duty of the wife and if it is not. It shall any be 
adjusted to be claim. Now in effect 'magistrate shall cancel' has turned to be 
'magistrate may cancel' and after the words 'whole of the sum" the words 
'sufficient to do the duty of maintenance' are inserted by construction. 
In Fazlun Bi v. Khader & others , the Apex court again followed the ruling in Bai 
Tahira's case. Where the husband had divorced his wife & paid Rs. 500/- as a 
Mehr and Rs. 750/- as a maintenance for the Iddat period. The Andhra Pradesh 
High Court made a clear distinction from the issue raised in Bai Tahira's case. In 
the instant case the husband did not raised any plea based on section 127 (3) (b) of 
Cr. P.C. But the Supreme Court reiterating its previous ruling observed that 
whether or not the plea was explicitly answered in that case, the wife was given 
right to demand maintenance from her husband. The facts of the case are 
enumerated in the following manner:-
Fazlun Bi, the appellant married Khader Wali, the respondent in 1966 and during 
their conjugal relationship a son was bom to them. Due to some misunderstanding 
and strain relationship between the couple, the appellant left the house of her 
husband and went to her father's house. She prayed for maintenance, which was 
granted by lower court and upheld by the High Court. After this the respondent 
divorced his wife unilaterally and paid her amount of 'Ma/zr' which was Rs. 500/-
*^(1980)Cr. L. J. 1249. 
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and the maintenance for the period Iddat which Rs. 750/- on the basis of divorce. 
The appellant Fuzlun Bi was ordered not entitled for maintenance as her 'Mahr' 
money and maintenance for 3 months was already paid. The session judge and 
High court also upheld the order of the magistrate. The appellant landed in 
Supreme Court against this judgment. The judgment was delivered by justice 
Krishna Iyer on behalf of Justice Chennappa Reddy & Justice A.P. Singh. The 
Honorable justice Krishna Iyer again expressed. That the payment of personal law 
amount as envisaged by Cr.P.C^^ should be reasonable and not illusor\. 
According to justice Krishna Iyer: "even by harmonizing payments under personal 
and customary laws with the obligation under section 125 to 127 of the liquidated 
and not a illusory amount will released the former husband from the continuing 
liability only if the sum paid is sufficient to maintain the former wife and salvage 
from the destitution. The payment of amount, customary or others, contemplated 
by the measure must inset the intent of preventing destitution and providing a sum 
which in more or less the present worth of the monthly maintenance allowances 
the divorces may need until death or remarriage overtake her. The polic) of the 
law about neglected wives and destitute divorcees and section 127 (3) (b) takes 
care to avoid double one under custom at the time of divorce and another under 
section 125. A farthing is no substitute for a fortune nor naive consent equivalent 
to intelligent acceptance". 
Mahr as defined by Muslim law is a token of respect for a Muslim women and 
payment of the Mahr would be payable by the husband in the loss of connubial 
relationship*''. The principle laid down in Fazlun Bi and Bai Tahira 's case violate 
the substantive Islamic law of maintenance. The approach of SC reflects the 
judicial legislation and not judicial interpretation. It is well established fact that 
constitution of India is the supreme law of the land. Therefore, the courts are in 
duty to follow the constitution rather then to deviate from the very sprit of the 
Constitution. Constitution is the source from which every institution derives 
"Section 127(3)(b). 
*'' Fazun bi v. khader and another (1980) Cr. L.J 1249 
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authority admits the theory of separation of power. Therefore, constitutionally the 
approach of the Apex court in the instant case is not legitimate. There is an 
experiment to give the harmonious construction to the section 125 and 127 (3) (b) 
or Cr. P.C. so as to achieve the true intention of the legislation. Section 127 (3) (b) 
was mean to provide protection to Muslim Women and dilute the evil effect of the 
definition of the 'wife' given under section 125 of Cr. P.C. But it is very 
unfortunate that judiciary could not take the cognizance in number of cases of 
conflict between Muslim personal law and section 125 of Cr.P.C. There is a clear 
cut conflict between section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and Muslim 
law. The court has restricted itself to only one aspect of the problem, that is right 
of a women saying that it is right of the women conferring an additional right is 
not in conflict with Muslim law, But the court failed to consider this important 
aspect, the duty of husband under Islamic law under Islam he is under obligation 
to pay maintenance till Iddat period and not after that period and divorce. Where 
as section 125 required conversely. 
Moreover the provision of the Cr. P.C, are applicable to all Indians irrespective of 
their cast, creed and religion. In order to prevent any grievance to any portion of 
state population by any state law or action special enactment are made to 
harnessed any excessive effect on their faith and sentiments. Thus in case of any 
inconstancy with section 125 of Cr.P.C. and the Shariyat Application Act,1937, 
latter should prevail. The definition of wife leads to the fact that a divorced 
Muslim woman irrespective of more resolution of marriage is entitled to 
maintenance up to the marriage or death. 
Therefore, the correct construction of section 127(3) (b) which impliedly protects 
the Muslim personal law, is that it is applicable to all the modes of the Muslim 
divorce determining the period of maintenance of divorced women, further, 
section 127(3)(b) does not deal with the case in which divorce has been obtained 
through the process of law. 
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Position after Shah Bano,s Judgment 
The unanimous decision of a five judge's constitution Bench of the Supreme 
Court in Mohd Ahmad Khan v. Shah Bano has evoked strong reaction among the 
Muslim and has also created the crisis. The facts of the case are as follows: 
Mohd Ahamd Khan an advocate of Indore married Shah Bano in the year 1932. In 
the course of matrimonial wedlock three sons and two daughters were born to 
Shah Bano, lived as husband and wife for more than four decades. But then 
Mohammad Ahmad Khan drove Shah Bano of the matrimonial home. In the year 
1975, in April 1978. after Shah Bano filed a petifion under section 125 of the code 
in the court of Judicial Magistrate, Indore asking for maintenance allowing from 
her husband of Rs. 500/- per month. Six months later filing of petition by Shah 
Bano her husband on November 6, 1978 divorced her by an irrevocable Talaq 
then Mohd Ahamd Khan himself, opposed the petition on the ground that he had 
already divorced her and paid her a sum of Rs. 3000/- on account of Mahr and 
maintenance for the period of Iddat. In August, 1979 after hearing both the sides 
the magistrate overruled the defence of Mohammad Ahmad Khan and passed an 
order granting Shah Bano a sum of Rs. 25/- per month by way of maintenance. 
She was not happy about the magistrate order as the income of the husband was 
around 60,000/- per year. Therefore, she filed an application in M.P. High Court 
to enhance this amount. The High Court enhanced the maintenance allowance to 
179, 00 per month. Aggrieved by this order of the High Court, Mohammad 
Ahmad Khan filed on appeal in the Supreme Court which was heard by a Bench 
consisting of Justice Murtaza Fazal Ali and Justice A. Varadh Rajan observed that 
Bai Tahira and Fazlun Bi^ ,^ cases where were not rightly decided, therefore, they 
referred this appeal to a larger Bench by an order. 
* ' A I R 1985 S C 945 
'* Bai Tahira v. Ali Husain. 
" Fazlun Bi v. Khader AFR 1980 SC 1730. 
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In this case Mohammad Ahmad Khan sought to defend his case in the following 
enumerated grounds:-
1. Under Muslim law a divorced women is entitled to maintenance during the 
period oflddat only and not there after. 
2. Since, Mohd. Ahmad Khan has already paid her the dower money which 
was according to him sum payable on divorce within the meaning of 
n o 
section of Cr. P.C. and maintenance order could be passed against him or 
maintained any longer the Five Judges Constitutional Bench of the 
Supreme Court, after wide ranging discussion based arrangement by the 
courts as well as by several intervenes including the All India Muslim 
Personal Law Board, animously upheld a single judgment delivered by the 
chief justice Chandrachud. 
3. A divorced wife is entitled to apply for maintenance under section 125 of 
the code. A Mahr is not a sum which under Muslim law is payable on 
divorce. So Mahr does not fall in the ambit of section 127 (3) (b) of the 
code. If there is only conflict between the section 125 of the code and 
Muslim Personal Law, section 125 override the personal laws. The 
government should implement Article 44 of the Constitution of India the 
written arguments of the appellant are raised as follows . 
It has been contended on behalf of the intravenous supporting the respondents by 
Sri Danial Latiti, Senior Advocate that under the Muslim Personal Law there is 
liability on the part on the former husband to his divorced wife. He relied on verse 
241 of chapter II"'' of the holy Quran. Which says; "For divorced women 
maintenance should be provided on a reasonable scale this is a duty of righteous". 
All that has been stated in the various verses of the Quaran does not contain the 
percepts of the law. Is the Prophet (S.A.W.) ordained, should be followed by the 
89 
Section I27(3)(b) 
Daniel Latifi "Muslim Law" XXI A.S. l.L (1985) pp. 389 - 390 see also journal of Islamic and 
Comparative law Quarterly Vol. No. 2 (1985) pp. 115-117. 
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Muslim as regard instances in point what Shafi which founder of Shafi School 
said can be persued. He is of the view that no maintenance is due to a woman 
repudiated by irrevocable divorce unless she is pregnant. It is clear that prophet 
(S.A.W.) himself made if clear that in case of irrevocable divorce no maintenance 
will be payable to divorce. 
Second caliph has recorded, a percept of the Prophet (S.A.W.) to the effect that 
maintenance is due to a women divorced thrice during her Iddat. The Hedaya^^ 
says, there are also a variety of traditions of same purpose. 
The Holy Quran^^ says, divorced women shall wait concerning them selves three 
monthly periods. Baillie has also state that a divorced women is entitled to 
maintenance during the period of Iddat. Further, so many event of authors have 
stated that divorced women is entitled to maintenance only during the period of 
Iddat. 
The question of Mata in the Quran^^ the nearest English equivalent is the word, 
'Provision', the essence lies in that 'mata'' has no connotation of recurrence as 
maintenance in Islam lays down that on divorce, women should be treated with 
due respect and apart from the husband, the later is exerted to make suitable gift at 
the time of separation. It is significant to point out the word 'mata' as temporary 
conveniens in sura 40 verse 39. The verse says, "O my people: thus life of the 
present is nothing but (temporary) convenience". 
The period of three months after divorce for women without menstruation. 
(Surah-talaq: Aiyat-4) of the Holy Quran which prescribed. 
„ ChaP'![^^^ P- 145. •^5 's^r^ Uni^f.r^-^'^ 
Verse 228. 
'^ Surah 2 Ayar 24 
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"Such of you women as have passed the age of monthly course for them the 
prescribed period, if he has any doubt is three months, and for those who have no 
q-i 
course (it is the same) . 
The period till delivery for those pregnant above Aiyat further prescribed : 
"for those who carry, (life within their wombs), there 
period is until they deliver their burden's and for those 
who fear God, he will make their path easy" ''. 
The fact is that only Islamic Sharia does not leave any women married, divorced 
women, widow without adequate protection even for a day. The rules relating for 
maintenance under Islam are based on definite and firm ground.The close relative 
of a divorced women in necessities are obliged to maintain her and this obligation 
calculated as per the schemes of inheritance.Thus the judgment in Bai Tahira 's 
and Fazlum Bi's case went against the Islamic law on divorce and maintenance 
which has been expressly protected by the Shariai Act, 1937. 
Enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce Act, 1986 
In 1986, it was the after a month of Shah Bano's judgement when the parliament 
had to mend not only to renovate the maintenance provisions but to pass a full 
fledged Act, relating to the maintenance for Muslim divorcee in accordance with 
Shariai. When the Shah Bano's case was decided by the Apex judiciar} a great 
controversy in Muslim circle denoted and the Muslims depreciated and deprecated 
to accept the judgment thereof and further demonstrated that the line of reasoning 
adopted by the judiciary was wholly unjustifiable and contrary to the Shariai. 
Under the banner of All India Muslim Personal Law Board, a countrywide, 
agitation and protest was started and same germinant the consensus of the 
majority of Muslim of India in favour of the move to demand statutory protection 
of their personal law relating to maintenance. 
''^ Surah Talaq Verse 4. 
'' Ibid. 
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The Muslim women (Protection of Rights on Divorce )Act, 1986 inspite of some 
shortcomings is by and large in consonance with Muslim law of maintenance and 
secures maintenance rights of Muslim married women to a great extent. The Apex 
court in such cases not merely ignored legislature history and the intention of the 
legislation but also violated the well established rules of harmonious construction. 
In the name of women emancipation the Supreme Court at so many occasions 
tried to violate the personal laws of Muslim and encroached the universally 
accepted principles of Quran and Hadith. 
Judicial Scenario after the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
Now some cases would be discussed to show the judicial scenario after enactment 
of Muslim Woman Act, 1986. 
Md. Yunus v. Bibi Phenkani Alias Nisa^^ the court was required to decide whether 
the right under section 125 of the Cr. P.C. to claim maintenance subsists even 
after the Act of 1986. It was held by the court that section 3 (1) (a) of the Act 
1986 curtailed the right of a divorced Muslim women to get maintenance for the 
period oflddat only. It was further said that the right to get maintenance from her 
husband given to a wife under section 125 of the court until she remarried has 
been impliedly repealed in case of a divorced Muslim wife governed by the 
provision of section 3 (1) (a) of the Act of 1986. 
InHaji Fazand Aliv. Noor Jahan^^ A women filed an application for the 
maintenance of herself and her 3 children. The magistrate granted rupees 300/- for 
children. The husband filed and appeal against the order arguing that the right of 
he children ancillary of 1986 Act, the children right to maintenance under section 
125 also was not maintainable. Negating the contention the court held that the 
children's right was independent of mother. All the clauses (a) (b) (c) and (d) of 
'* (1987) 2 Crimes 241. 
' " (1988)^ . P.C. L.J 1421 (Raj.) 
58 
Part B: Chapter 1: Maintenance of Wife under Muslim Law 
section 125 have used the conjunction 'or' which is significant and shall each 
claimant's right is independent. 
In A.A. Abdullah v. A.B. Mehmoona Saiyacf^ It was held that a divorced MusHm 
woman is entitled to maintenance after contemplation of her need and the 
maintenance is not limited only up to Iddat period. The phrase used in section 3 
(1) (a) of the Act of 1986 is "Reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be 
made and paid to her" indicates that the parliament intended to see that the 
divorced women gets sufficient means of livelihood after the divorce and that she 
does not become destitute or is not thrown on the street without a roof over her 
head and without any means of sustaining herself and her children. It was also 
held that the word 'within' under section 3 (1) (a) could not be read as for or 
during therefore the husband was held to be liable for making reasonable and fair 
provision and maintenance to the wife even after the period of Iddat. 
In AbidAli v. Mst Raisa Begum^^ the division bench of Rajasthan High Court has 
given the following view. In this case the question before the court was the effect 
of the provision of Act 1986 on an order passed under section 125 of Cr.P.C. The 
division bench held that the Act of 1986 does not contain any saving clause for 
the right created by an order passed in favour of divorced Muslim women. The 
Act has completely obliterated the right of such women to get maintenance. The 
appeal without saving such right and that right now can not be enforced under 
section 125 clause (3) of the code. A brief reference may also be made to the 
decision in Abduallah Gafoor v. A. U. Pathumma Bibi, It was held by the court 
that divorced Muslim women is not entitled to invoked section 127 of the 
Criminal Procedure code for seeking enhancement of maintenance after 19 May, 
1986, the date on which the Act of 1986 came in to force. The court further held 
that even though section 125-127 of the code have not been repealed by the Act of 
" A I R 1988 (Guj.) 141. 
'* (1988) L. Raj. LR 104. 
' '(1989)CrLJ 1224 Kamataka 
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1986. it can be said that the Act of 1986 supplemented, widen, or enshrined the 
contents of the rights ensuring to the wife under the code. 
In All V. SufairaJ"" it was held that under section 3 (1) (a) of the Act ol" 1986. a 
divorced Muslim woman is not only entitled to maintenance for the period of 
Iddat from her former husband but also to a reasonable and fair provision for her 
future. In this case the distinction was made between what is reasonable what is 
reasonable and fair provision and maintenance which is payable to the divorced 
women. The learned judge concluded that: "It is clear that the Muslim who 
believes in god must give a reasonable amount by way of gift or maintenance to 
the divorced lady. The gift or maintenance which is payable to the divorced 
women." The learned judge concluded that: "It is clear that Muslim who believes 
in God must give a reasonable amount by way of gift or maintenance is not 
limited to the period of Iddat it is for her fijture livelihood because God wishes to 
see all well". 
The court, therefore held that under section 3 (1) (a) a divorced Muslim not only 
entitled to the maintenance for the period of Iddat from her former husband but 
also to a reasonable and fair provision for her future and directed the Magistrate to 
pass orders giving effect to this intention of the legislature. 
Judiciary on the Application of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986 
An impression is there that the Act undoes the gains of divorced MusHm 
Woman. It is not correct as a close analysis shows that the Act does nothing 
like throwing out of window the Shah Bano's verdict or the legislative 
progress enshrined in the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. The 
main features of this enactment may be summed up as the Act accords relief 
to the divorcee. It does not say that Mahr is a consideration for divorce for is 
of the sum referred to in section 127(3)(b) Cr. P.C. It does not lay down that 
'""C1988) 3 crimes 147. 
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no maintenance is to be paid to the divorcee after iddat or that she is to be 
abandoned for the life after iddat. 
The preamble of Act says that it is 'an Act to protect the rights of Muslim 
Women who have been divorced and further to provide for matters, connected 
and incidental thereto. Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986, entitles a divorced woman to (i) reasonable and fair 
provision, and (ii) maintenance to her, (iii) provision and maintenance to her 
children for two years, (iv) Mahr amount and (v) All properties given to her 
before, at the time and after her marriage. Out of these, the 'provision' and 
'maintenance' are to be made and paid to her within the Iddat period by her 
former husband. 
Does it mean that the maintenance is to be paid to her only during the Iddat 
period? The original controversy resurrected in Arab A. Abdullah v. Arab 
Arab Bail Mohmuna Saiyad Bhai^°\ In the instant case, the matter takes into 
consideration was the validity of an order passed under Section 125 of Cr P.C. 
in view of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The 
main questions arose in the instant case for the determinations are: (i) 
Whether by the enactment of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986, the orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate of First 
Class, under Cr. P.C. ordering the husband to pay the maintenance to the wife 
are nullified? (ii) Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986, takes away the rights which are conferred upon the 
Muslim divorced wife under the personal law or under general law. (iii) 
Whether the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 
provides that a divorced Woman is entitled to have maintenance during the 
iddat Period only. The divorced wife (the respondent) has filed criminal 
application under Sec. 125 of Cr. P.C. claiming maintenance allowance, the 
magistrate granted Rs. 250 per month. Additional Session Judge confirmed 
" " A I R 1988 Guj 141 
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the order. Against that order, the petitioner husband filed the criminal 
application in the High Court. The petitioner husband contended that So lar as 
the first issue was concerned they alleged that in view of the provision of 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986, the orders 
passed by the magistrate under section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code is 
non-est. They relied on section 7 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce)Act 1986 to support their argument. In regard to the second issue 
they contended according to the Muslim Personal Law, the husbands liability 
to provide of his divorced wife is limited to iddat period, despite the fact that 
she is unable to maintain herself. The reason behind that is that the enactment 
of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 is to nullify 
the interpretation given by the Supreme Court in Shah Bano's Case . He 
contended that a divorced woman is entitled to get maintenance from her 
former husband within the iddat period only and that word within should be 
read as "during" or "for". It was further admitted that if the parliament wanted 
to provide for future maintenance to the divorced women, then the parliament 
would not have provided that the said amount should be paid within the iddat 
period but instead of that the parliament has specified the time. Contentions of 
the respondent wife were that_with regard to the first issue they submitted that 
section 7 of Muslim Woman (Protection of Rights on Divorce)Act 1986 
clearly indicates that there is no inconsistency between the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 and the provisions of Cr. P.C. 125 
to 128. The provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) 
Act 1986 grant more relief to the divorced women depending upon the 
financial position of her former husband. So far as the second point is 
concerned the and alleged that there is a presumption against an implied 
repeal because there is a presumption that the legislature enacts the laws with 
complete knowledge of existing laws obtaining on the same subject and to 
failure to add a repealing clause indicates that the intention of the legislature 
was not to repeal the existing laws. As to the third question they submitted 
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that parliament has provided for making fair and reasonable provision and the 
payment of fair and reasonable provision and the payment of fair and 
reasonable maintenance to the divorced women after visualizing and 
contemplating her future need and the same has to be made within the iddat 
period by her former husband. The Hon'ble Gujrat High Court speaking 
through M.B. Shah J. reasoned and held as under: 
(i) As regards the nullify of an order passed under section 125 of Cr P.C. 
after the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce)Act, 1986, the Court reasoned that there is no section in the Act 
which nullifies the order passed by the magistrate under section 125 of 
Cr. P.C. Further once the order under Section 125 of Cr P.C. has been 
passed granting maintenance to the divorced wife then her rights are 
crystallized. There is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Act 
and provisions of Section 125-128 of Cr. P.C. On the contrary Act grants 
more relief to divorced Muslim Women depending upon the financial 
posifion of her husband. 
(ii) As to the second issue the court relied on the statement of object and 
reasons as well as preamble of the Act. The Court held that on the plain 
reading of the Act, it cannot be said that Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce)Act 1986 in any way adversely affects the personal 
right of a Muslim divorced woman. Nowhere, it is provided that the 
rights which are conferred upon a Muslim divorced wife under personal 
law are abrogated or repealed. It does not provide that it was enacted for 
taking away same rights which Muslim woman seeking either under the 
personal law or general law under section 125 of Criminal Procedure 
Code. 
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(iii) For the third issue, the court held that the Act nowhere specified the 
period for which she was entitled to get maintenance, nor did tlie Act 
provide that it was for iddat only. 
The dictionary meaning of the word 'within' is 'on or before' and 'not later 
than', 'not beyond' therefore the word 'within' meant that he was bound to 
make and pay the provision and maintenance before the expiration of iddat 
period. It seems that the Judgment is not upto the mark as it could not decide 
successfully the matter whether maintenance of Muslim Women is onl\ for 
iddat period or beyond Iddat Period. 
But the Kerala High Court has expressed a different view in Abdul Gafoor 
Kunju V. Patumma Beevi,^^^ The question before the Kerala High Court was 
whether the Muslim Women was entitled to invoke the section 127 after the 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 came into force. 
The Session Judge was of the opinion that she could invoke the section 127 of 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 as the Act 
contained no repeal, express or implied of the Code. Hon'ble High Court held 
that the section 125 to 128 of the Cr. P.C. are not repealed but excluded or 
restricted. The well known rule of interpretation is that a special law excludes 
a general law when a special law namely the Muslim women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was passed to govern maintenance to Muslim 
wives, application to general law i.e. under code was excluded or restricted. 
On giving the answer to the argument that the right under the code is 
independent of personal law and unaffected., it was the opinion of Kerala 
High Court that if one considers the context in which the Act came into 
existence or its object, it is not possible to think that it was intended to 
provide additional right. It seems that the Judgment tried to give some clear 
cut picture regarding the (i)Application of Muslim Woman (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce)Act, 1986, (ii) Exclusion or restriction of the application of 
'"^(1989) 1 KLJ337 
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section 125 to 128 of Cr. P.C. by a well known rule of interpretation that 
special law exclude the general law; (iii) it tried to reduce the effect of 
judgment in A.A. Abdullah's case which says that the Act gives the additional 
arrangement for the maintenance of women when maintenance by previous 
husband fell short of her needs. This judgment clarified that the provisions of 
the Act is not to provide additional right. The view of Gujrat High Court in 
A.A. Abdullah Case was also not approved by the High Courts of Andhra 
Pradesh, Guwahati and Calcutta. 
In Usma Khan Bahmani v.Fathimunnissa Begum'"\thQ issues of the case 
were: (i)Whether a divorced Muslim woman can claim maintenance under 
section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code,1973 from her former husband even 
after the passing of the Act of 1986? (ii) Whether the maintenance 
contemplated under section 3(1) (a) of the Act of 1986 is restricted onl\ for 
the period oi Iddatl Or (iii) whether a fair and reasonable provision has to be 
made for future also with in the period of Iddat? Here the ratio of Majority 
judgment was 2:1. The Court held on issue No.l that section-3 of the Act of 
1986 starts with a non obstante clause as it provides that "not with standing 
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force '' 
Under section 4 of the Act, the liability to pay maintenance to a divorced 
woman, if she is unable to maintain herself after the period of Iddat. is 
devolved upon the relatives and if the relatives are not available on the Waqf 
Board. 
The very concept of the liability of the husband is limited for and during the 
period of Iddat, under section 5, it is provided that the husband and wife 
would be governed section 125 to 128 of the Cr. P.C if they exercise their 
option in the manner stated therein. If the option is not exercised, then it is 
' " 1990Cr. LJ 1364 APHC 
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clear that they will not be governed by the provision of sections 125 to 125 of 
theCr.P.C. 
Further, under section 7 of the Act, the intention of the legislature is clear 
when it provided that every application by a divorced woman under section 
125 or 127 of the Cr.P.C, pending before the court or magistrate in the 
commencement of the Act of 1986, shall note with standing contained in that 
code and subject to the provision of in accordance with the provisions section 
5 of this Act be disposed of in accordance with the provision of the Act of 
1986. 
A combined and harmonious reading of the provisions of section 3 to 7 of the 
Act of 1986 clearly demonstrate that the general object of the legislation is to 
bring the law of maintenance payable to the wife in consonance with the 
principles of Muslim law. On the Issue No.2, the court held that the liability 
of the Muslim husband to pay reasonable and fair provision and maintenance 
is confined only for and during the period of Iddat. The concept of reasonable 
and fair provision and maintenance carmot be read as meaning two different 
things.The word ""Mata" used in Ayat 241 in chapter 11"'^  of the Holy Quran 
indicates that the word "Provision" and "maintenance" convey the same 
meaning. Even in Shah Bano case, it is recognized that the word "provision" 
and "maintenance" convey the same meaning. In such circumstances to say 
that a fair and reasonable provision shall be made by her husband forecasting 
her future needs, would amount to the negation of the very object of the Act 
for which Act of 1986 has been promulgated. It would give rise to a new 
concept of liability on the part of the husband which would be difficult to be 
translated in concrete term as it would be almost impossible to visualize the 
future needs of the divorced Muslim woman which would be depending upon 
the several factor like remarriage, change in the circumstances, or in the life 
style etc. 
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Therefore, in regard to the second question the judge held that the Hability of 
Muslim husband to pay the fair and reasonable provision and maintenance 
contemplated under section 3(1 )(a), of the Act is confined only uplo the 
period of Iddat. On the Issue No.3 the Court held that under section 7 of the 
Act of 1986, it is specifically stated that every application by a divorced 
women under section 125 or 127 of the code pending before a Magistrate on 
the commencement of the Act, shall be disposed of by the Magistrate in 
accordance with the provision of the Act of 1986, having due regard to 
section 5 of the Act and the rules framed there under with regard to the option 
to be exercised by the parties. Any order of maintenance which is not 
warranted by the provision of the Act, cannot be executed against the 
husband. Therefore the Judge held that the section 125 to 128 of Cr. P.C is not 
applicable after coming into force Act 1986, save in so far as the parties 
exercise their option under section 5 of the Act, to be governed by the 
provision of section 125 to 128 of Cr.P.C. it seems that judgment is good 
keeping in view of the actual posifion under the Muslim personal Law and 
historical background of the Act of 1986. It has very rightly decided the issues 
involved in the present case and has clarified the legal position on those 
issues. It has rightly remarked that divorced woman can not claim 
maintenance under section 125 of Cr. P.C, after passing of the Act of 1986, 
except under some special circumstances. It has held that if it has been 
recognized that the liability of the husband to pay maintenance is limited to 
the period of Iddat, then there is no justification to hold that the liability of 
making a reasonable future provision extend beyond the period of Iddat under 
section 3(1 )(a) of the Act. It has remarked correctly that the combined and 
harmonious reading of the section 3 to section 7 the Act of 1986, clearly 
demonstrate that the general object of the legislation is to bring the law of 
maintenance payable to the wife in consonance with the principles of Muslim 
Law. In this case the majority dissented from the decision of Gujrat high 
Court in A.A. Abdullah's case, and decision of the Kerela High Court in AH v. 
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sufaira^^'^ wherein it was held that under section 3(l)(a) a divorced woman 
was not only entitled to maintenance up to the period of Iddat but also to a 
reasonable and fair provision for her future. 
The Calcutta High court, also dissented from the decision of the Gujrat High 
Court in Abdul Rashid v. Sultana Begum,'"^ in the instant case, the main 
issues were: (i)Whether the Muslim husband has to provide maintenance to 
his divorced wife up to the period of Iddat or beyond the Iddat period?(ii)Can 
the section 4 be interpreted to mean that it was open to divorced wife to claim 
maintenance under section 4 of the Act in addition to section 3 of Act. The 
Hon'ble High Court held on issue 1 that the liability of the husband to provide 
maintenance was limited for the period of Iddat and therefore, she was unable 
to maintain herself. She had to make an application under section 4 of the Act. 
In view of the Act the court held on issue 2, that the provision could not be 
fairy interpreted to mean that it was open to divorced wife to claim 
maintenance under section 4 of Act in addition to what she might have 
received under section 3 of Act. This judgment seems to be good one keepmg 
in view of the legislative background of Act of 1986 and actual position of 
Muslim personal law. This judgment was akin to the principles laid down in 
Usman Khan Bahmani's case. It opposes the decision of A.A. Abdullah's Case 
decided by the Gujrat High Court. It rejected the interpretation of the Gujrat 
High Court which laid down that the provisions of the Act is to make an 
additional arrangements for her when maintenance allowance and provision 
settled by the previous husband fell short of her needs on account of some 
unforeseen circumstances. 
Yet the Calcutta High Court took a different liberal view in Shakeela Parveen 
V. Haider AH,'"^ the main Issues were: (i) Whether the term 'with in' used in 
section 3(1) (a) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 
'""(1999)3 Crimes 147 
105 
'"'•2001 (I)CLJ608 
(1992)Cri. LJ76 
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1986 be interpreted only as 'for or during' or a future provision may be made 
within Iddat period or for beyond Iddat period, (ii) What procedure is lo be 
followed when the petition regarding maintenance under section 125 of Cr 
P.C. is pending before the passing of Act? The Calcutta High Court 
extensively quoted the judgment of Gujrat High Court and approved both the 
principles therein. The order passed by the Magistrate under section 125 of 
Cr. P.C. was not by nullified the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986. The word 'within' in section 3 does not mean 'for or 
during', it means 'on or before', and the parliament has nowhere provided that 
the reasonable and fair provision and maintenance are limited only for the 
Iddat period. Therefore the word 'within' meant the he was bound to make 
and to pay the provision and maintenance before expiration of Iddat. 
Accordingly it was held that the expression during Iddat period should be 
extended till a Mohammedan divorced female enters remarriage. The 
magistrate's order was modified to the effect that the petitioner was entitled to 
get maintenance allowance from the date of application till she remarries. 
This judgment can't be said upto the mark ,as it did not pay regard to the 
historical background of the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The High Court under the guise of so called 
judicial activism tried to extend the meaning of word 'within' unnecessarily. 
The additional benefit of maintenance to the divorced Muslim women till she 
remarries was an open encroachment of Muslim Personal Law. The meaning 
of word 'within' under section 3(l)(a) of the Act can't be extended 'upto the 
remarriage of divorcee, while taking regard to the purpose, object & preamble 
of the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 
1986. 
Here it would be worth mentioning the case of Idris Ali v. Ramesha 
Khatoon, the question before the court was whether the provision of 
""AIR1989Gauhati24 
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Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, shall have the 
application when a divorced woman approaches the court of a magistrate for 
the execution of final order already passed in her favour under section 125 of 
Cr.P.C. Petitioner contended that as soon as the Muslim Women (Protection 
of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 came into force. Sections 125, 127, 128 of 
Cr.P.C, so far as divorced Muslim women are concerned became inapplicable 
on Muslim women by virtue of section 7 of Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. It was also pointed out that such aforesaid order 
of maintenance would become nugatory and non-est in the eye of Law as the 
right of the parties have to be decided according to the provision of section 3 
and section 4 of this new Act by virtue of section-7 of the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. Respondent contended that 
section 7 has settled all controversy at rest .It was pointed out that section 7 in 
terms mentioned that if an application filed by a divorced woman under 
section 125 or 127 of Cr. P.C, is pending before a magistrate on the 
commencement of the Act of 1986 then only it has to be disposed of 
according to the provisions of new Act of 1986. His submission was that 
condition precedent for the application of new Act was the pendency of the 
proceedings, under section 125 and 127 of Cr P.C, on the date of the 
commencement a new Act of 1986 and once the proceeding is disposed of 
under secfion 125 or 127 of Cr.P.C, by the magistrate then there is no 
pendency. After analyzing the fact end the law on the point the Hon'ble High 
Court held that if a divorced Muslim woman approaches the court of a 
magistrate for the execution of a final order already passed under section 125, 
127 of Cr.P.C, earlier to the new act of 1986, then she will have the right to 
get the order executed under sectionl28 of Cr.P.C,. which section has been 
excluded from section 7 of Act of 1986, and section 7 of new Act of 1986 
would not take away the right. It may be said, that this judgment shows the 
tendency of the judiciary to the application of the provisions of Criminal 
Procedure Code inspite of the coming into force of Muslim Women 
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(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, which has made the sufficient 
provisions for providing the right to the maintenance of Mushm divorcees. 
The single bench of the Bombay High Court had considered it just and 
equitable that the husband should pay the divorced wife the maintenance 
allowance even after the Iddat period, but thought it is necessary that this 
matter, in the interest of justice, should be reaccessed to full bench for its 
decision, therefore this revision application of Karim Abdul Rehman Seikh v/s 
Shehnaiz Karim Seikh,'"^ came up before the fliU bench comprising shah J., 
smt.Ranjana desai J., and Fatil J. The four prime questions before the court 
were: 
1. Whether the Muslim husband's liability under section 3(a) of Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 to make a fair and 
reasonable provision and to pay maintenance is restricted only upto the 
Iddat period or whether it extends beyond Iddat period. 
2. Whether the Act has the effect of invalidating the orders Judgments 
passed under section 125 of the Code prior to the coming into force of 
Act, that is, whether the Act divests parties of vested rights or benefits 
by acting retrospectively, 
3. After the commencement of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 whether the divorced Muslim wife apply Ibr 
maintenance by invoking the provision of chapter IX of Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973? 
4. Whether the family court has the jurisdiction to try applications of 
Muslim divorced woman for maintenance after coming into operation 
of Muslim woman Act 1986. 
'"* 2000 (3) Mh. L.J 555 
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The High Court held for issue No. 1, that a reasonable and fair provision has 
got to be distinct from maintenance. The word provision has a future content. 
In the context of section 3(1) (a) of this Act, it would mean an amount as 
would be necessary for the divorced woman to look after herself alter the 
Iddat period. This may involve amount for her residence, food, clothing, 
medicine and the like expenses. So, like section 125 of the code no maximum 
amount is fixed here, but the quantum, has got to be substantial having regard 
to the future needs of the woman. The court concluded that the husband has to 
pay her within the Iddat period but he has to make the reasonable and fair 
provision for her within the Iddat period, which should take care of her for the 
rest of her life or till she incurs any disability under the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 while deciding this amount 
regard will be had to the needs of the divorced woman, the standards of the 
life enjoyed by her during her marriage and the means of her former husband. 
If the husband is unable to arrange for such a lump sum payment he can ask 
for the installment. Further, till the husband makes the provision the 
magistrate may direct monthly payment to her even beyond Iddat, till amount 
is fixed. On the second Issue, the court held that "The section of 125 Cr P.C, 
prior to the commencement of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 are not nullified by reason of its coming into force. The 
Act does not direst the divorced woman's right to get maintenance under 
section 125 of the vested in her by reason of the order of he competent court 
passed prior to its coming into force". 
For the issue No.3, the court ruled that "After the commencement of the Act a 
divorced wife cannot apply for maintenance by invoking the provisions of 
Chapter IX of the code. According to section 5 a divorced wife and her 
husband can by an agreement subject themselves to the jurisdiction of 
magistrate under section 125 and 127 of the code and agree to be governed by 
the said provisions (but not without such agreement). 
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On the 4"' issue, the Court held "by virtue of section 3 and section 4 of the 
said Act the application under section 5 and section 7 of the Act have lo be 
filed before the Magistrate only. We therefore hold that after coming into 
force of the Act of 1986 the Muslim women can apply under section 3 and 
section 4 of Act only before the first class Magistrate having jurisdiction 
under the code. The Family court can not deal with such application". 
These case prior to Denial Latifi case can be quoted in brief such as in Rafiq 
V. Farida Bi,'"^ Madhya Pradesh High Court held that if a divorced Muslim 
wife wanted maintenance beyond the Iddat period, she had to make her 
relatives/Waqf Board as parties to suit under section 4 of Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, as the husband could not be 
made a party. Virtually this judgment is in the consonance of the intention of 
the legislature in enactment of Muslim woman Act, 1986. This judgment 
support the traditional view of Muslim Personal Law that the view of Muslim 
Personal law that the husband could not be made a party if the divorced 
Muslim woman wanted maintenance beyond the Iddat period. 
In Julekha v. M Fazal"^, again the M.P. High Court held that the Muslim 
law makes the husband liable for the maintenance of his divorced wife during 
Iddat only. It seems that this judgment of Court also supported the traditional 
view of Muslim Personal Law that the liability of the Muslim husband to 
maintain his divorced wife is only for the duration of Iddat. Thus the legal 
status if the right of the divorced wife continued to be fluid variable according 
to the views of different High Courts. The main contentious issues were: 
I. Whether the fair and reasonable provision was in additions to the 
maintenance allowance or included in it. i.e. quantum of maintenance. 
"^ 2000 (2) MPWM 77 MP 
''" 2000 (I) Vidhi Baswar 123 MP 
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II. The duration of time for which the husband liability extends whether 
within Iddat or beyond Iddat period. 
No doubt, the Muslim divorcee's fate was an progressive path: 
• In the first stage the husband could get rid of himself of 
all liability by simply divorcing her. 
• The second stage was the 1973 amendment in the 
Criminal Procedure Code which laid down that husband 
was liable to maintain her even after Talaq; this was her 
first stage of acquirement. But the husband found an 
escape value which was the payment of Mahr. 
• In the third stage, the Judiciary insisted on making this 
Mahr reasonable. 
• The forth stage came when the court insisted on her 
maintenance, whether Mahr. Is given or not. 
• The fifth stage was marked by Act of 1986. 
The uncertainties, which was led by the different decisions of the various 
High Courts had to be settled. The verdict of Supreme Court in Danial Latifi 
v/s Union of India'" deciding some of the unsolved questions. Issue before 
the Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is an unconstitutional on the ground that it 
infringed Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitufion? Contentions of Petitioner 
were the following: 
(i) Section 125 Cr. P.C. is a provision made in respect of woman 
belonging to all religions and the exclusion of Muslim woman from its 
benefit would be a discrimination between woman and woman 
' " (2001) 7 sec 740; H (2001) DMC 714 
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(ii) A part from the gender justice caused in the country this discrimination 
further leads to a monstrous proposition of nulHfying a law declared by 
this court in Shah Bano's case. Thus there is the violation of equality 
before law but also the equal protection of law and inherent 
infringement of article 21 of the Constitution as well as basic human 
values. 
(iii) If the object of section of 125 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is to 
avoid vagrancy, the remedy there under can not be denied to Muslim 
woman. 
(iv) The Act is un-Islamic, un-Constitutional and it has the potential of 
suffocating the Muslim woman and under mines the secular, character 
which is the basic feature of the Constitution. 
(v) There is no reason to deprive the Muslim women from the applicabiiit) 
of the provision of section 125 Cr.P.C, and consequently, the present 
Act must be held to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of 
Constitution. 
(vi) The conferment of the power on magistrate under section 3 (2) and 
section 4 of the Act is different from the right of a Muslim woman like 
any other woman in the country, to avail of the remedies under section 
125 of Cr.P.C, and such deprivation would make the act un-
constitutional as there is no nexus to deprive a Muslim woman from 
availing remedies under section 125 of Cr.P.C, not with standing the 
fact that the conditions precedent for availing of the said remedies are 
satisfied. 
The Contention of respondent in the support of the impugned act, were 
the following: 
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(i) Where a question of maintenance which forms parts of the personal 
law of a community, what is fair and reasonable is a question of fact in 
that context. Under section 3 of the Act , it is provided that a 
reasonable and fair provision to be made and paid by her former 
husband within the period of Iddat and when the fact has clearl} been 
stated in the provision , the question of interpretation as to whether it is 
for life or for the period of Iddat would not arise. 
(ii) The personal law of any community is a legitimate basis for 
discrimination, if at all and therefore does not offend Article 14 & 21 
of the Constitution. 
(iii) The parliament enacted the impugned Article respecting the personal 
law of the Muslims and that itself is a legitimate basis for making a 
differentiation; that a separate law for community on the basis of 
personal law applicable to such community can not be held to be 
discriminatory. 
(iv) The Act resolved all issues, bearing in mind the personal law of the 
Muslim community and the fact that the benefit of section - 125 of 
Cr.P.C have not been extended to a Muslim woman would not 
necessarily lead to a conclusion that there is no provision on the Act to 
protect the Muslim woman from vagrancy and from being a destitute. 
The Hon'ble Supreme Court by analyzing these points held that section 3 of 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, lays down two 
separate and distinct obligations on the part of the husband, viz, 
(i) To make reasonable and fair provision for his divorced wife. 
(ii) To provide maintenance for her 
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The emphasis is not on the nature of duration of any such 
provision or maintenance, but on the time by which an 
arrangement for the payment of provisions and maintenance 
should be concluded namely, 'within the Iddat period'. 
The Court upheld the validity of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 and observed in para 31 as under: 
''Para 31 - Even under the Act, the parties agreed that the provisions of 
section 125 of Cr.P.C. would still be attracted and even otherwise, the 
Magistrate has been conferred the power to make appropriate provision. 
Therefore, what could be earlier granted by Magistrate under section 125 of 
Cr.P.C. would now be granted by the magistrate under the very Act itself. 
The Court finally concluded in para 36, while upholding the validity of the 
Act. We may sum up our conclusions:-
(i) A Muslim husband is liable to make a reasonable and fair 
provision for the future of divorced wife which includes her 
maintenance as well. Such provisions extending beyond the Iddat 
period must be made by the terms of section 3(1) (a) of the Act. 
(ii) Liability of the husband of maintain his wife under section 3(1) (a) 
of the Act is not confined to Iddat period. 
(iii) A divorced Muslim woman, who has not remarried and who is not 
able to maintain herself after the Iddat period can proceed under 
section 4 of the Act against her relatives who are liable to maintain 
her in proportion to the properties which they inherit on her death, 
from such divorced woman including her children and her parents. 
In case of any of the relative being unable to pay maintenance. 
Magistrate may direct the State Waqf Board, established under the 
Act to pay maintenance. 
77 
Part B: Chapter 1: Maintenance of Wife under Muslim Law 
(iv) The provisions of the Act do not offend Articles 14, 15 and 21 of 
the Constitution. 
This judgment can be said the commendable and praiseworthy step of the 
Supreme Court to upheld the Constitutional validity of the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 and paid due regard lo the 
feelings of the minority community, i.e., the Muslim Community. As the right 
of the preservation of personal law is the fundamental right of any 
community, on that ground the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 can not be called to run counter to the constitutional 
mandate. But besides it, it can also be said that in the guise of Judicial 
activism the court has given the liberal meaning to term within under section 
- 3(1) (a) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 by 
making the husband liable to make fair and reasonable provision within the 
Iddat period, for beyond the Iddat period. It must be noted that the making of 
the future provision beyond the Iddat period for the maintenance of the 
divorced Muslim wife is foreign to Muslim Personal Law. Indian Muslims 
have their deep feelings and emotional attachment to their personal law, so it 
can also be said here that the sorry position is that even the Apex court was no 
more hesitant to venture in the areas well understood and free from legislative 
activity. It is to be noteworthy that as the court refer the question of section 4 
of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 for upholding 
the constitutional validity of the same, is appreciable. This step of the court 
tried to avoid the jurisdiction of the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection 
of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
After the judgment of Denial Latifi's case a very interesting question came 
before the Bombay High Court in Sayeed khan Faujdar khan v/s Zaheha 
Begum, the question was that, can a divorced Muslim wife who withdraw 
an earlier application under section 125 of Cr.P.C, on the basis of settlement, 
"^ AIR 2006 Bom 39 
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subsequently claim maintenances under section 3 of Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The court held that earlier 
settlement made by the parities was binding on the parties. The wife's 
application under section 3 of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 is nothing but an abuse of the process of the court. A 
consent order or settlement arrived between the parties in proceeding under 
section 125 of Cr.P.C, operates as estoppels and no party can be allowed to 
Muslim or abuse the process of court by filing subsequent application under a 
different act for the same relief, on the same set of facts or circumstances. 
Recently in 2007 a very interesting question came before Bombay High 
Court that whether a divorced Muslim wife alone can apply for the 
maintenance from her husband under section-125 of chapter IX^ of Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 in Seikh Mohammad V. Naseem Begum"\ the Hon'ble 
High Court held that Muslim divorced wife alone cannot apply for the 
maintenance under chapter IX**" of Cr.P.C, she can only apply under this 
chapter IX, section 125 of Cr.P.C, when there is an agreement between her 
and her husband under section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986. The court held that section 5 of the Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 has been designed to mean that 
no proceeding can be initiated on the application of section 125 of Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973 by divorced Muslim wife unless there is an agreement 
between her and her husband to be governed under section 125 of Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1973. Application of the section 125 of Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1973 is maintainable subject to the mandate of section 5 of Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
Virtually the judgment of the court is good as it held that the purpose of the 
enactment of section 5 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986 must be fulfilled. The contrary view of the court would 
' " (2007) DMC 226 Bombay High Court. 
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have under that section otiose. Here the High Court reUed on the Judgment oi' 
Supreme Court in Denial Latifi v. Union of India '', in which court upheld the 
vahdity of MusUm woman Act, 1986. 
In Riaj Fitima and Another (Petitioner) v. Mohd. Sharif [Respondent], the 
issues before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi were: 
(i) Whether the statement of divorce taken by the husband in the written 
statement sufficient to constitute divorce? 
(ii) Whether in the absence of direct and insufficient evidence to prove 
divorce, the bar of the Act of 1986, be made applicable in entertaining 
application of maintenance under section 125 of Cr. P.C? 
The petitioner alleged that she was still the wife of the respondent and she 
was turned out of the matrimonial home for the want of dowry. 
Respondent husband contended that he had obtained divorce from his wife by 
the Mufti. He also alleged that in view of the divorce the petition was 
debarred from claiming maintenance under section 125 Cr. P.C. Instead of the 
remedy of the petitioner was to take recourse to the provisions of the Muslim 
Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 as under:-
(i) So far as the first issue was concerned it was laid down that mere 
statement of the husband taken in a written statement that he had 
divorced his wife on a particular date would not suffice. If this 
accepted it would be prone to misuse. The court laid down the 
following perquisites for proving that divorce had taken place:-
a) Divorce must be for the reasonable cause. 
114 II (2001) DMC 174 
"^ (2007) DMC 26 Delhi High Court 
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b) There must be a proclamation of Talaq thrice in the presence of 
witnesses. 
c) There must the proof of the payment of Mahr. 
d) The husband must prove that there was attempt for conciliation 
prior to divorce. 
(ii) as far as the second contention is concerned the court relied upon on 
Salim Basha v/s Mumtaz Begum"^, where Madras High Court opines 
that Talaq was not valid if there was no valid evidence of pre-divorce 
conference for the settlement by two mediators from both sides. The 
Court held that respondent could not proved that he had divorced his 
wife and, thus the bar of the Act of 1986 was not applicable in 
entertaining the application of the petition under section 125 of Cr. 
P.C. 
This judgment is based on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Shamim Ara 
v/s State ofU.P"^ wherein the court held that ^Talaq to be effective has to be 
explicitly proclaimed'. Thus in the present social welfare context the 
judgment is praiseworthy as it lays down that for a valid Talaq, the pre-
requisites of the valid Talaq must be fulfilled. It will be helpful in the future 
to reduce the abuse of the authority of the Muslim man of giving his wife 
divorce arbitrary and in rash manner. Here it was clearly settled that mere the 
written statement of the husband that he had divorced his wife on a particular 
day will not be sufficient to prove divorce. 
In Tripura Board o/ffa^(petitioner) v/s Ayesha Bibi"^ /Respondent], the 
issue before the Gauhati High Court was that whether the Waqf board can be 
directed to pay maintenance amount without offering a opportunity of hearing 
' " 1991 (Criminal) 
"'J.T,2002(7)SC570 
' " A I R 2008 Gauhati 10 
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before passing the order? The petitioner contended that there is no provision 
in the Act of 1986 to pay a maintenance allowance to a divorced Muslim 
woman by the Waqf Board, unless there is a specific order of competent court 
of law. He has submitted that before passing the initial order, the Waqf board 
ought to have been heard by the learned CJM. 
Countering the contentions of the petitioner, the learned council for 
respondent submitted that the whole exercise on the part of the Waqf Board is 
to frustrate the claim of the respondent wife for the maintenance. As regard 
the notice to the Board, he has submitted that such notice is not contemplated 
in section 4(2) of the Act nor in any provision of the Act. In this contention he 
has placed his reliance on the two decision of the Apex cast in Syed Fatima 
MachCs. and Denial Latifi's case. The learned Judge held that the plea of the 
petitioner board that before passing the order, they ought to have been heard, 
it will be suffice to say that no such provision is discernible in the Act. 
Section 4(2) of the Act provides that where a divorced woman is unable to 
maintain herself and she has no relative in subsection 4(1) or such relatives 
have not enough means to pay the maintenance ordered by the magistrate or 
other relatives have not the means to pay the shares of those relatives whose 
shares have been ordered by the magistrate to be paid by such other relatives 
under the second proviso to subsection (l),the magistrate may by order direct 
the State Waqf Board to pay such maintenance as determined by him. 
Is seems that in the present case the petitioner board instead of acting towords 
implementation of the object and reasons for which the aforesaid Act of 1986 
was made, resisted the same making all efforts. Therefore the court should 
resort to prompt implementation of the order. 
Judicial Activism and its limits 
The concept of judicial activism which is another name of innovative 
interpretation was not of the recent past. The twin concept of judicial review 
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and judicial activism were said to be born simultaneously. The judicial 
creativity may yield good results if it is the result of principled activism but if 
it is propelled by partisanship, it may result in catastrophic consequences 
generating conflicts which may lead to the agitation to a particular community 
or group. 
The common criticism we hear about the judicial activism is that in the name 
of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution and legislative enactments, 
the judiciary often rewrites them without explicitly stating so and in this 
process , some of the personal opinions of the judges metamorphose into legal 
principles and constitutional values. On the other facet of this line of criticism 
is that in the name of judicial activism , the theory of sepration of powers is 
overthrown and the judiciary is undermining the authority of the legislature 
and the executive by encroaching upon the spheres reserved for them .Judicial 
activism can be compared with legislative activism. The latter is of two types 
: (i) activist law making ; {n).dynamic law making . Activist law making 
implies the legislature taking the existing ideas from the consensus prevailing 
in the society. Dynamic law making surfaces when legislature creates an idea 
outside the consensus and before it is formulated, propagates it. Dynamic law 
making always ordinarily carries with it legitimacy because it is the creation 
of the legislatures who have the popular mandate. Judges cannot play such a 
dynamic role; no idea alien to the constitutional objectives can be 
metamorphosed by judicial interpretation into a binding constitutional 
principle. 
Thus from the above discussion on the case laws regarding the maintenance 
of the divorced Muslim wife, I feel that judiciary has taken the double 
standard in the interpretations of the provisions of Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
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On one side the decisions of various High Courts and Apex Court upheld the 
constitutional validity of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) 
Act, 1986, but on the other side I, may feel sorry to say that by unnecessarily 
interpreting the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986, the judiciary has tried to venture in the areas well 
understood and free from legislative activity. 
During the process of the analysis of the background history and spirit of the 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986,1 felt that Indian 
Muslims have deep emotional feelings regarding their personal law. Their 
personal law is constitutionally recognized and judicially enforced. So that the 
judiciary while interpreting the provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of 
Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, should pay due regard to the sentiment and 
emotion of the Muslim community, as "religion, ethics and law are therefore, 
so intermixed in Islam ""^ 
(c) Identification Of Pitfalls 
The above analysis of the case shows that the role of judiciary is under the 
sphere of doubt regarding the implementation of Islamic personal law with 
respect to maintenance, divorce intestate succession despite the fact that these 
matters have been specifically included in section 2 of Shariai Application 
Act, 1937. 
Specially in the matter of maintenance and divorce the steps of judiciary has 
been very harsh and has been touching the line of judicial distortion rather 
than judicial Activism. 
The tendency of the Judiciary to the implementation of the section 125 of Cr. 
P.C. regarding the maintenance of the divorce wife is frustating the people of 
Islamic community. This step is being taken inspite of the fact that the 
"'' Faizee, A.A. A., A Modem Approach to Islam 32 (1981 ed.) p. 36 
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Muslim divorced spouse can be governed by section 125 of Cr. PC. only 
when there is an agreement between them under section 5 of Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce)Act, 1986.or the application of the secular 
provisions to the divorced Muslim Spouse the judiciary has taken the 
innovative steps of not accepting the validity of talaq which has been give 
under the rules of Islamic Shariah.As soon as there is not the sufficient proof 
of talaq. The spouse comes outside the preview of Muslim Women 
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986, and the maintenance provision 
under secular law under section 125 of Cr. P.C. is applied. 
These cases have been recently shown in. 
> Iqbal Bano v. State ofU.P. 120 
> Shameen Beig v. Najmunnisa Begum 
The burning question is that the judiciary's steps to decided the validity of 
talaq is correct of which the sole authority of taking decision is with the 
Muslim community. It comes under the sphere of personal law which has 
been constitutionally recognized. The right of the application of the personal 
law in these matters has been specifically provided under the section 2 of 
Shariai Application Act, 1937 by the Indian Legislature.The main pitfalls in 
the interpretation of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)Act, 
1986 is, that is felt by me as a Student of personal law, the interpretation of 
section 3 of this Act in such manner so as to stretch the maintenance provision 
beyond the Iddat period in the guise of future maintenance . Moreover it gas 
been done by the Apex Judiciary through the Denial Latifi 's case. Now the 
various decisions of High Courts is recognizing the existence and validity of 
provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. 
'^ ^ DMC 2007 
'^' DMC 2007 Bom H.C. 738 
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But they are very much hesitant to cross the limits set by the apex judiciary. 
The recent case'^^ of Bombay High Court is the clear example of the hesitant 
tendency of the High Court to cross the limits set by Apex judiciary. 
The pitfalls may be summed up briefly in the following manners:-
> The wrong implementation of the Cr. P.C. 127 (3) (b) by not taking 
into consideration the legislative history and intention of legislature of 
inserting it. The judiciary forgot that this section was inserted to save 
the Muslim Personal Law. 
> The solution made by the judiciary regarding the controversy of 
maintenance of divorced Muslim wife within Iddat period went against 
the Islamic Personal Law. 
> The loopholes in the drafting of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986, which provides the chance to judiciary to 
interpret the provisions of the Act against the Islamic Personal Law. 
The indifferent behaviours of judiciary toward the Islamic Personal Law, 
despite knowing the fact that this community has deep feeling and emotion 
regarding their religion. 
(d) Advocacy for reforms and improvements 
There are some loopholes which are being felt by the scholars of the Islamic 
Matrimony regarding the drafting of Muslim women (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Act, 1986. 
As it is very contentions issue so I want to put forth some humble point 
regarding the reforms in the drafting of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce) Act, 1986: 
122 Sheikh Mohd v Naseem Begum I (2007) DMC 226 Bombay High Court 
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> The expression "who has been divorce by or has obtained divorce 
from her husband" used in the act includes. 
(a) Unilateral Talaq by Husband 
(b) Khula demanded by and effected at the wife's instances whether 
in or outside the court 
(c) Divorce by mutual consent (mubarat) 
(d) Dissolution of Marriage under the provisions of the Dissolution of 
Muslim marriage 1939 
(e) Annulment of void or irregular marriage. 
These kinds do not have similar consequences for maintenance in different 
school. But Act deals with all forms of divorce without attaching importance 
of differences. 
> The definition of term Iddat in section 2(b) does not expressly state as 
to upon whom observing oiIddat is mandatory and on whose part it is 
not obligatory. 
For example a woman divorced before consummation of marriage, is not 
required to observe Iddat, hence the clumsy definition in section 2(a) by not 
excluding such woman is objectionable under Islamic rules. 
> Despite the clear cut humane rule of Muslim law that Muslim law 
cares the maintenance of divorce who is breast feeding and child 
maintenance is the absolute duty of father, the section 3(i) (b) is the 
victim of confused drafting and bound to be interpreted by court in 
various ways. 
> Section 3(i) (c) of the Act states that a divorced woman is entitled to 
"an amount equal to sum of Mahr or Dower is payable because in 
87 
Part B: Chapter 1: Maintenance of Wife under Muslim Law 
Islamic law there are many situations in which payment varies. The 
ambiguous language of said section makes Mahr payable in every 
case of divorce. 
Thus by analyzing the aforesaid loopholes of the Act which is now 
representing manifestly the Islamic Community to whole world, must be 
removed and be tried to be reformed in the line of true Islamic principles. 
As the Constitution of India regards the personal laws of every 
community the judiciary must not assume the role of legislature and 
Mujtahid and does not try to venture into areas of personal laws which are 
well understood and free from legislative activity. 
It is also to be noted that the trend which has been set by the Judiciary to 
maintain Muslim divorce beyond the Iddat period must be reviewed 
according to line of Islamic Sharia. As this concept is foreign to the spirit 
of Islamic law. The reason is that there is no any interfamiliar transfer of 
girl on marriage unlike Hindu family. 
88 
Parte 
Part C: Chapter 1: Maintenance of Wife under Christian La w 
PART C 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of Chapter 1 which deals with the 'Maintenance of 
wife under Christian Law'. This Chapter similar to the previous part, has also 
been discussed under the following heading: (a) Analysis of the legislative 
provisions (b) Evaluation of the judicial pronouncements (c) Identification of 
pitfalls (d) Advocacy of reforms and improvements. It deals with the analysis 
of the relevant provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, regarding the 
maintenance of wife under the Christian Law. Further it deals with the 
evaluation of the judicial pronouncements. The identification of pitfalls and 
the advocacy of reforms and improvements which are discussed shortly. 
89 
Part C: Chapter 1: Maintenance of Wife under Christian La w 
CHAPTER - 1 
MAINTENANCE OF WIFE UNDER CHRISTIAN LAW 
(a) Analysis of legislative provisions 
Maintenance of wife under Christian Law is dealt with the section-36, 
section-37 and section-38 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Section 36 of 
Indian divorce Act, 1869, deals with the petition for the expenses of the 
proceedings and alimony pending the suit. According to this section, in any 
suit under this act whether it be instituted by a husband or a wife and whether 
or not she has obtained an order of protection, the wife may present a petition 
I 9T 
for the expenses of the proceedings and alimony pending the suit . Such a 
petition shall be served on the husband and the court on being satisfied by the 
truth of the statement contained therein, may make such order on the husband 
for the expenses of proceedings and alimony pending the suit as it may seem 
just'^^'.There is a proviso in this section which says that the petition for the 
expenses of the proceeding and alimony pending the suit shall as far as 
possible, be disposed of with in the sixty days from the date of the service of 
notice on the respondent'^^. 
The object of this section is to provide the wife with a source of maintenance, 
whilst a matrimonial suit is pending. She is entitled to present a petition of 
alimony pendente lite. Alimony pendente lite is an ad interim arrangement 
and its payment is enforced on the ground of necessity and only when the 
wife has no other means of subsistence. Where pending her application for 
alimony the wife gets advances from a third party to meet her necessaries the 
third party is in equity entitled to recover the sums advanced by him from the 
Substituted for the word "for the alimony pending suit by Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001 
'^ '' By Amending Act of 2001 
' " Inserted by the Amending Act of 2001. 
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husband'^^.The alimony may be claimed by the wife in suits for (i) Nullity (ii) 
Dissolution (iii) Judicial Separation (iv) Restitution conjugal rights of 
marriage. 
A husband should file an oath to a petition for alimony by the wife. He must 
state his gross income. He must specify deductions of any that he claims and 
it is not sufficient for him merely to state his net annual income . A husband 
who does not file an answer to the petition can not be allowed to cross 
examine witnesses produced by the wife in support of her alimony petition 
nor he can give any rebutting evidence.Husband may plead that his wife has 
income and property.lt is to open to the husband to plead that the wife is 
being supported by the co-respondent and is not entitled to alimony pendente 
lite.Wt may also plead that the wife has been living separate for many years 
before the institution of suit and she has supported herself during the 
separation and is still able to do so.The husband is not allowed to put any 
question direct or indirect with regard to her adultery. The averment of 
adulatory in answer to a petition for alimony is irrelevant and the court is 
bound to presume that the wife is innocent till she is proved guilty. An 
alimony petition should be made at the earliest opportunity, as delay may go 
to show that the wife has a means of subsistence and is not in any need of 
alimony. 
The Indian law is quite clear that in case of a suit for divorce or for nullity of 
marriage, the order for alimony remains operative only till the decree is made 
absolute or is confirmed.In case of a suit for the restitution of conjugal rights 
the order for alimony pendente lite extends upto the time allowed to the 
husband for complying with the decree or till such times she refuse to comply 
with it.The quantum of alimony that should be awarded to a wife will depend 
on the facts and circumstances of each case. The parties may mutually agree 
'^ '' Weingarten v. Engel 1947, All E.R. 425. 
' " Nankis v. Nankis 33 L.J. P. 24 
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to the amount.The Indian law with regard to the quantum of alimony pendente 
lite that the alimony pendente lite should in no case exceed 1/5"^  of the 
husband's average net income for the past three years.The general rule 
regarding the commencement of payment of alimony is that it commences 
from the date of the service of the petition on the husband and not the date of 
the return of the citation.The Indian law is quite clear that alimony shall 
continue till such time as the decree is not made absolute or is confirmed by 
High Court. The Act contemplates the payment of alimony to the wife so long 
as she continues in law to be a wife . 
The Indian Divorce Act, 1869 is silent as to the mode of the enforcement of 
decrees and an order for the payment of alimony pendente lite must be made 
according to the provisions of Civil Procedure Code ,1908 for the execution 
of decrees. 
An order for alimony pendente lite does not create a legal debt, but a liability 
to pay and is only a personal allowance and so long as the order subsist the 
right to alimony can not be alienated or released. When a marriage has been 
validity terminated under the law of the parties domicile, any maintenance 
order made by the court other than the court of parties domicile, must also 
1 129 
comes to an end. 
Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act 1869,deals with the petition of 
permanent alimony. This section empowers the High Court and District judge 
to order that the husband shall secure to the wife such gross sum of money ,or 
such annual sum of money for any term not exceeding her own life, as having 
regard to her fortune. This order may be made by the High Court or District 
Judge, if it thinks fit, on any decree absolutely declaring a marriage to be 
dissolved, or any decree of judicial separation obtained by wife . In every 
such case the court may make an order on the husband for payment to the 
Manchanda,, The law and Practice of Divorce (ed. 2""*, 1958,Allahabad), pp. 303,304 
'^ '' Id. pp.305,306 
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wife of such monthly or weekly sum for her maintenance and support as the 
court may think reasonable. There is also a proviso in this section which 
provides that if the husband afterwards from any cause becomes unable to 
make such payment, it shall be lawful for the court to discharge or modif\ the 
order or temporarily to suspend the same as to whole or any part of the money 
so ordered to be paid, and again to revive the same order wholly or in part, as 
to the court seems fit. This section empowers the court to order for the 
permanent alimony or permanent maintenance after a final decree for judicial 
separation or dissolution of marriage has been granted. The District Judge is 
also given the same power after the decree passed by him has been confirmed 
by the High Court. 
The court may order the payment of such permanent alimony or maintenance 
in three ways: 
1) It may secure a gross sum of money 
2) It may provide an annuity for wife life 
3) It may order the husband for the payment of monthly or weekly sum for 
her maintenance. 
The proviso to the section gives the court a power to vary, discharge, modify 
or temporarily suspend the payment order, if the husband subsequently 
becoming unable to make such payment. 
There is no hard and fast rule as to the quantum of alimony that should be 
given to an innocent wife. The law has laid down no exact proportion. The 
allocation of alimony is a matter for the discretion of the court to be exercised 
upon a consideration of all the circumstances of the case'^^.As a general rule 
permanent alimony may be more than alimony pendente lite. There is some 
'^"Id. p.310 
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factors of which section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 enjoins the court. 
The factors are: 
(i) The conduct of the parties before and after marriage. 
(ii) The nature and source of husband 
(iii) Fortune of the wife, if any, and other circumstances of the case. 
The usual rate of permanent alimony is one third of joint net income. The 
court in this matter is guided by the practice of the ecclesiastical courts. 
However, the court has the discretion and may award less than one third of 
the joint net income, if the circumstances so warrant. But the court will not 
grant more than one third unless exceptional circumstances exist. 
The permanent alimony may be increased or decreased by the court according 
or the changing circumstance and the fortune of the parties. 
Permanent maintenance may be claimed by an application filed at any time 
after the decree nisi. In any event no order for permanent maintenance can 
take effect prior to the passing of the decree absolute. An application after 
final decree may be made within the two months of the final decree; but it 
may be filed even subsequently with the leave of the court.The petition for the 
permanent maintenance must be served on the opposite party 
Section 38 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, deals with the rules regarding the 
payment of alimony. According to this section, in all cases in which the Court 
makes any decree or order for alimony, it may direct the same to be paid 
either to the wife herself, or to any trustee on her behalf . The Court may 
impose any terms or restrictions which to the Court seems expedient .Thus 
this section lays down the mode of payment of alimony. The court is given 
power on making an order for alimony, be it alimony pendente lite or 
permanent alimony .Alimony may be paid wither direct to the wife herself or 
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to her trustee. Such trustee, must however be approved by the court. The court 
is given power to impose any term or restrictions on the payment of alimony 
and may appoint new trustee from time to time. The whole object oi this 
section is to ensure that the wife receives the allotted alimony. 
(b) Evaluation of Judicial Pronouncements 
As it has been mentioned earlier that only landmark and trendsetter judicial 
decisions in the Indian context are being shown and discussed here. Since the 
Christian are not the majority in India. Population is less and the number of 
litigation and reported cases are almost negligible. There is not any recent 
cases regarding the maintenance of wife which can be termed as landmark 
and trendsetter. This community is also peace loving and satisfied like the 
Parsi community. Thus, though having the many loopholes in the drafting of 
the Christian laws regarding the matrimonial causes and maintenance, there is 
not any huge controversy like other communities. 
(c) Identification of Pitfalls 
The need for reforms in the Indian Divorce Act enacted as early as 1869 has 
long been felt and advocated by the public, jurist, the law commission and the 
judiciary, including Supreme Court. 
It is note worthy that the ground for divorce under the Act were too limited 
and harsh too before the insertion of section 10 A as amended in 2001. 
Even as between husband and wife there is discrimination as under section 
10, the husband has simply to prove adultery where as the wife has to prove 
another matrimonial offence along with adultery, for granting relief. 
There were another a lacuna which is not suitable as per the present 
conditions of the society that a dissolution decree passed by the District Court 
needs to be confirmed by the High Court. It makes the procedure of divorce 
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complicated and time killing. [Requirement of confirmation by the High 
Court has now, been dropped the Divorce Act 2001]. 
Besides these shortcomings there is also some shortcomings in the drafting of 
the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 which is shown by the fact that the Act 
considers the wife as a property of the husband. Who under section 34 of the 
Act, is entitled to claim damages from the wife's adulterer 
The Act was also discriminatory on the basis of religion. While under all 
other personal laws cruelty and desertion, inter alia are the grounds for 
divorce but under this Act, there are only ground for judicial separation. Thus 
a Christian married wife under the Act was expected to endure all sort of 
cruelties without any right to seek divorce where as "wife married under the 
Hindu or the Parsi Marriage Law, is entitled to divorce, may be even in less 
unbearable situations'^^. 
As early as section 10, was challenged as illegal discrimination on the ground 
of gender in Dwarja Bai v. Ninan'^\ the court however dismissed the plea and 
observed (obiter). 
" / consider that section 10 as it stands is not 
prima facie repugnant to Articles 13 and 15 of the 
constitution. It appears to be based on a sensible 
classification and after taking the abilities of the man 
and woman and the result of their Acts, and not merely 
based on sex, when alone it will be repugnant to the 
constitution " 
ni 
132 
Kusum, Marriage & Divorce Law Mannual (ed. 2000, Delhi,New Delhi) p. 28. 
Jorden Deingdeh v. S.S. Chopra AIR 1985 SC 935. 
' " A I R 1953 Mad. 792 at 800. 
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(d) Advocacy for Reforms and Improvements 
The issue relating to the changes in the Indian Divorce act, 1869 has been 
hanging for more than forty years. Various law commissions in their reports 
stating with the IS"* report as well as various High Courts,such as the High 
Courts of Mumbai, Chennai, Andhra Pradesh, Koikata and Kerala has 
emphasized the need for bringing about gender equality in the matter on 
grounds of divorce as available to the Christian spouse. It was also painted out 
that there was no need for a provision which required confirmation of decree 
for dissolution of marriage by the High Courts. In the Indian Divorce 
(Amendment) Bill 2001, the Government had sought to bring about gender 
equality by amending section 10, section 17 and section 20 to do away with 
the confirmation by the High Court of decree of divorce or nullit) of 
marriage. 
Other provisions of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, were also sought to be 
amended to make certain consequential changes. The Governments approach 
in the matter was to bring about minimal changes in consonance with ruling 
of the courts and uniformity of law among Christians. 
A provision has been made for the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. 
This is an the lines of section 13(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and 
section 28 of the Special Marriage Act, 1954 
Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 which provides that the High 
Courts and the District court shall act and give relief on the principles applied 
by the English Courts has been deleted since after attaining independence, this 
provision seems to have become redundant. Section 34 of this Act which 
provided that the husband may claim damages for adultery in a petition 
limited to that object, and the ground of his wife having committed adultery 
has been deleted. 
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Section 35 of this Act provided that where in a petition by the husband, the 
alleged adulterer was made a co-respondent and the adultery is established, 
the court may order the respondent (adulterer) to pay the cost of the 
proceedings. This provision has also which provides that the alimony 
pendente lite shall not exceed one fifth of the husband's average net income 
for the 3 years, the next proceeding date of the order has also been deleted. 
Section 10 for which there were an objection by the jurists that it wee agamst 
the gender equality.lt has now been modified after the Personal Laws 
Amendment,2001, both husband and wife can seek a divorce on the grounds 
of, 
(i) Adultery 
(ii) Cruelty 
(iii) Insanity for more than 2 years 
(iv) Incurable leprosy for more than 2 years 
(v) Conversion to another religion 
(vi) Willftil refusal to consummate marriage 
(vii) Not being heard of for 7 years 
(viii) Veneral disease in communicable stage from for 2 years 
(ix) Failure to obey the order for the restitution of conjugal 
rights. 
However the wife has been permitted to sue for divorce of additional grounds 
if the husband is guilty of: 
(i) Rape 
(ii) Sodomy 
(iii) Bestiality 
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All there years, Christian Spouses were compelled to mudslinging each other 
even if they desired to for in for divorce due to the non establishment of 
grounds. Now section 10-A is added under which mutual consent has also 
been made a ground for divorce. 
Thus it can be said that after the Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, is a 
great step for the improvement of the lacunas in the drafting of old Act. 
It has adopted the good features of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and Special 
Marriage Act, 1954. The present situation of the Christian law thus can be said 
to be satisfactory. 
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PART D 
INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation consists of Chapter 1, which deals with the 'Maintenance of 
the wife under the Parsi Laws'. Similar to the other parts of this dissertation 
the Chapter 1 of this Part-D has also been discussed under the following 
headings: (a) Analysis of the legislative provisions (b) Evaluation of the 
judicial pronouncements (c) Identification of pitfalls (d) Advocacy of reforms 
and improvements. The first deals with the relevant provisions of the Parsi 
Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, regarding the maintenance of wife. After the 
analysis of the legislative provisions of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act. 
1988, regarding the maintenance of wife, the rest of the headings, i.e., 
evaluation of the judicial pronouncements, identification of pitfalls, advocacy 
of reforms and improvements have been discussed. 
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CHAPTER -1 
MAINTENANCE OF WIFE UNDER PARSI LAW 
(a) Analysis of the legislative provisions 
Maintenance of wife under Parsi Law is dealt with tlie Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, 1988. The relevant provisions of this Act regarding the 
maintenance of wife are: Section 39, section 40, section 41 and section 42. 
Section 39 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, deals with the 
alimony pendente lite. This section empowers the court to order the defendant 
to pay to the plaintiff, the expenses of the suit, and weekly or monthly sum 
during the suit, if it appears to the Court that either the wife or the husband 
has no independent income sufficient for her or his support and the necessar> 
expenses of the suit. The Court, while ordering under this section pay regard 
to the plaintiffs own income and the income of the defendant .There is a 
proviso in this section which provides that the application for the payment of 
expenses of suit shall be disposed of within 60days from date of service of 
notice on the wife or the husband as the case may be .Alimony pendente 
lite as a temporary provision for the wife or the husband awarded by the 
court, ordering the husband or wife, as the case may be to pay alimony 
pendente lite. In order to obtain alimony pendente lite and expenses of 
proceeding, the wife or the husband has to prove following conditions that: 
1) She or he has no independent income. 
2) Her or his income is not sufficient for her or his support and the necessary 
expenses of the suit. 
''•' Subs by the Marriage laws Amendment Act, 2001 [Act No 49 of 2001] 
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Where neither party (husband or wife) has mean to meet the expenses of other 
party , no order may be made .In granting relief under section of Act. the 
court shall take into consideration:-
1) The defendants income and; 
2) The plaintiff own income 
Relief under section 39 can be sought either by wife or the husband who 
initiated the substantive proceedings. The question as to who is the husband 
or wife has been interpreted by Deshpande J. of Bombay high Court while 
interpreting the said term with reference to sections 24 & 25 of the Hindu 
Marriage Act, 1955 which are pari materia to instant provision. His lordship 
has taken the view that the expression wife as used in section 24 and section 
25 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, doesn't presupposes an existing jural 
relationship of husband and wife, but it merely descriptive of the person who 
may claim to any other relief which can be granted under Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955'^^. Alimony pendente lite under section 39 can be sought during the 
pendency of any suit arising under the Act. When proceedings are over in 
their entirely, there is no question of the application of section 39 . Under 
section 39 of Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, no fixation of the 
quantum by the legislature is made for the purpose of alimony pendent elite. It 
is left to the court to determine the same having regard to the income of 
plaintiff and defendant. Ordinary, the Court grant maintenance under section-
39 from the date of the application. The court should grant alimony pendente 
lite since the date of demand . The judiciary is of the view that the court 
may grant alimony pendente lite from the date of the service of the notice or 
petition on the defendant'^^. 
'^' Preeti v. Ravind Kumar AIR 1979 Al 29 
'^ •^  Hemraj Shamrao Umredkar v. Smt Leela. AIR 1989 bom. 146 (SC) 
' " Nirmala v. Ramdas AIR 1973 P&H 48 
'^' Pratima v. Kamal (1964) 68 CWM 316. 
' " Sudharshan Kumar v. Chhagar Singh (1978) Kash. L.J. 
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Section 40 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988,deals with the 
permanent alimony and maintenance, section 40(1) of the Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, 1988, empowers any court to order the defendant to pay to the 
plaintiff for her or his maintenance and support, such gross sum or such 
monthly or periodical sum for a term not exceeding the life of a plaintifj" as 
having regard to the defendant's own income and other property , at the time 
of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto on application made 
to it for the purpose by either spouse. Any such payment may be secured if 
necessary by a charge on the movable or immovable property of the 
defendant, if it may seems to the court to be just.According to section-40(2) 
of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, if the Court is satisfied that there 
is a change in the circumstances of either party at any time after it has made 
an order under subsection (1), it may, at the instance of either party, \ar>, 
modify, or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just. 
According to section-40(3) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, if the 
Court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been made under 
this section has remarried or if party is husband, had sexual intercourse with 
any woman outside wedlock, it may at the instance of other party vary modify 
or rescind any such order in such manner as the court may deem just. This 
section aims at providing for permanent alimony and maintenance to the 
husband or wife, whoever is in need of the same. This relief would be 
available only when a decree for judicial separation or restitution of conjugal 
rights or divorce or nullity of marriage has been passed by any court 
exercising jurisdiction under this Act. An order under section 40 can be 
passed: (a) either at the time of passing any decree, or (b) at any time 
subsequent thereto. No order can be passed under section 40 if the substantive 
petition is whether dismissed by the court''*^, or withdrawn by the 
" Mazumdeet v. Mazumdar, AIR Cal 428. 
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petitioner''".While passing under section 40 (1) of the Act, it is obligator)' 
upon the court to have regard to the conduct of the parties of the case.The 
conduct of the parties does not mean merely the conduct of the party who is 
applicant for maintenance, but also of the other spouse in relation to their life 
together as husband and wife''*^.Permanent alimony can be granted even to an 
erring spouse and the fact that the wife did not comply with the restitution of 
conjugal right can not by itself disentitle her to claim permanent alimony''' \ 
Doubtless, the conduct of the parties any be factor in deciding claim or 
permanent alimony, but each case has to be decided on its own merits, it is 
not correct to say that grant of judicial separation on the ground of cruelty of 
the wife, is a bar to her getting permanent alimony'''^. 
Section 40 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, Act puts stress on the 
conduct of the parties during the matrimonial life and the court pays due 
regard to that factor. Section 40 (1) and (3) place considerable emphasis on 
wife being chaste not during matrimonial tie but also after the decree to retain 
her eligibility for the purpose of maintenance. Now in view of the Phrase 
"the conduct of the parties and other circumstance of the case ," under section 
40 (1) of the Act, the courts are duty bound to take into consideration the 
health of applicant and source of income and if court satisfied that she is in 
poor health and has no sources of income and there is no one to look after her, 
maintenance should be granted though she had been guilty of adultery and 
divorce was granted on that ground'''^.The Madhya Pradesh High Court 
opined that where the conduct of wife is unchaste; the question of alimony or 
maintenance does not arise .It is clear from the above discussion that 
regarding the relevancy of the conduct of the parties in deciding claim of 
"" Shanta Ram v. Hirabai, AIR 1962 Bom. 27 
'^' Lalithamma v. R. Kanan AIR, 1966 Mys. 178. 
"^ Premji v. Rai Sarkar Kanji AIR 1968 
'"' Shabbir ,Mohd. ,Parsi Law in India (ed. 5"^  ,1991,Allahabad)p. 111 
'"' Jain, S.C, The law relating to Marriage and Divorce, (Ed. 1 1 , 1980, Delhi) p. 195 
''"' Lila Devi v. Manohar lal AIR 1959 MP 349 
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permanent alimony, each case should be decided on its own merits. In fixing 
the amount of maintenance under section 40 of the Act the court is required to 
consider the following matter: 
(a) Income and property of the party who is required to pay. 
(b) Income and property of the non claimant 
(c) Conduct of the parties 
(d) Circumstances of the case. 
Under section 40 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, 
the court can order one party to pay the other for the 
maintenance and support: 
(a) A gross sum 
(b) A sum to be paid monthly 
(c) A sum to be paid periodically. 
The status of the husband and wife must be taken into account and not the 
status of father or any other relations. 
According to the practice of English courts, which generally influences our 
judicial activity, the monthly allowance that the defendant may be ordered to 
is one third of his or her income. In some case Indian Judiciary has followed 
this English Rule. The one third rules is merely a guideline and there is no 
rigidity about it''*'. 
The court is competent to fix more than one third or less than one third in a 
given case depending the circumstance of the case. The court under section 40 
(2) and (3) is empowered to vary, modify or rescind its order passed under 
""Supra Note I44,p.ll4 
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section 40 (1) of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988, Act in an> of 
following circumstances: 
• If the court is satisfied that the party in whose favour an order has been 
passed, has remarried ; or 
• If such party is wife, that she has not remain chaste; or 
• If such party is the husband, that he had sexual intercourse with any 
woman outside wedlock. 
Thus, in view of the change in circumstances of either party at any time after 
it has made an order under section 40 (1), the court may vary, modify, or 
rescind at the instance of either party in such manner as the court deem just. 
(b) Evaluation of the Judicial Pronouncements 
As it has been mentioned earlier that in this dissertation only landmark and 
trend setter judicial decision has been put forth. Since the Parsi community is 
a self satisfied community with the position of their existing laws, the number 
of litigation cases is almost negligible regarding the maintenance of wife 
which can be said a trend setter and landmark. This community is peace 
loving and has been free from the controversies we see and had been 
watching in the other communities. There is no denying the fact that the 
modem and forward looking approach of the Indian Parsis is praiseworthy. 
The self contentment of the Indian Parsis is undoubtedly a challenge to the 
other communities. 
(c) Identification of Pitfalls 
It is a well known fact that the Parsi community is a self satisfied community 
towards their laws. It is a very progress looking community and deals mostly 
matters according to their customs. The Parsi Law regarding the Marriage, 
divorce or the matrimonial relief has been amended in 1936 and 1988. The 
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original Act was passed at the express representation of the I'arsi 
community. The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, has amended the 
original Act, i.e., 'the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1865'.The original Act 
was based on the recommendation of the marriage committee of the Parsi 
Law Association. The provisions of the Act were essentially based on the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1858. As a general rule there is a presumption that 
the Parsi is governed by English common law''' . The Parsi Marriage and 
Divorce Act, 1936 was also amended in 1988 and the same is known as the 
Parsi Marriage and Divorce (Amendment) Act, 1988. 
Some pitfalls in the original Act i.e., the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 
1865, were found by the Parsi community whose sentiments and values was 
for the time being governed by the Act of 1865. They desired a variation in 
their legal resolve. The Act of 1865 had been obtained after sincere endeavour 
of the community, yet the legislation which followed the model of the British 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857, had featured that had became repugnant to the 
conscience of the community, e,g., adultery or adultery coupled with some 
other matrimonial offence were the extreme circumstances entitling the 
aggrieved party to a divorce, the remedy of judicial separation was available 
only to the wife etc. 
It was the background that the Act of 1936 sought. The model of the Act of 
1936 largely follows that of its predecessor. It provides for matrimonial 
remedies of divorce, dissolution and annulment of marriage. Contemporary 
views of the community called for updating the law. As a result the Parsi 
Marriage and Divorce (Amendment) Act, 1988, was enacted. This 
incorporates the advantageous aspect of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the 
Indian Divorce Act 1869;the Special Marriage Act 1954 the Matrimonial 
causes act, 1965 and the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act 1939. 
'••^  See Ardasar v. Arabai 9 Bom. 290. 
'"^  Naroji v. Rogers 4 Bom. HCRI; Bai Manek Bai v. bai Meerbai 6 Bom. 363. 
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(d) Advocacy of Reforms and Improvements 
We have analyzed that the contemporary view of the Parsi Community called 
for updating the law. The result is the Parsi Marriage and Divorce 
(Amendment) Act, 1988. This incorporate the advantageous aspects ol the 
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, the Special 
Marriage Act, 1954, the Matrimonial Cause Act 1965 and the Dissolution of 
Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. 
The remedy of divorce by mutual consent has been extended in favour of 
Parsi Spouses. The relief of alimony pendente lite and permanent alimony 
technically known as ancillary relief are available to both spouse without any 
discrimination on the basis of sex. 
It shows that the Indian Parsi have shown the forward looking and Modem 
approach towards their personal law. They have shown their willingness to 
adopt the good and beneficial provisions from many sister communities. 
There is no hesitation in the Parsi community to adopt the beneficial 
provisions from any sister community. 
It is to be a noteworthy fact that the population of the Parsi community is 
very much lesser than the other communities in India. They are peace loving 
people and satisfied with their existing laws. Due to these reasons the number 
of the litigation cases in India is very much negligible. 
From the above discussion it can be concluded that the modem and forward 
looking approach of the Indian Parsis are praiseworthy. The selfcontentment 
of the Indian Parsis is a challenge to the other Indian minorities as their 
successful survival need the desirability of the rational rethinking regarding 
the fate of their personal laws particularly against the complexities of 
contemporary era. The discussion is clear from the fact that at one hand there 
is a plethora of cases in Hindu and Muslim community regarding the 
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matrimonial causes which exert a lot of pressure on the judiciary, on the other 
hand the cases of Parsi community is almost negligible. 
Therefore it seems to be correct to conclude that the present law system of 
the Parsi community is satisfactory and not very much instant reforms are 
needed regarding the maintenance of wife. 
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PART E 
INTRODUCTION 
In this 'Part E' of this dissertation, the comparative analysis of all the four 
personal law of India would be discussed. The distinctive features of each 
personal law would also be discussed here. This part shows that no 
community is isolated in the society from the influence of other communities, 
and it is impossible for any community to avoid the influence of other sister 
community. The present position of the women in their respective personal 
law with regard to their maintenance is tried to be shown here. 
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CHAPTER -1 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH THE HIGHLIGHTS OF 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES 
It is doubtless that the comparative study of Indian personal laws gives a 
clear cut picture that each personal law has its positive points and negative 
points. Every community has the influence of other sister communities to a 
certain extent as no community can remain isolated from the other in the 
society. During Mughal period, the customs of Hindu were influenced by 
Islamic culture. Muslims have adopted various types of cultural tendencies of 
the Hindu community such as the Dowry system or the express of the pomp 
and show at the time of marriage whereas Islam expresses total simplicity. 
The Parsi and Christian law have been modified according to the tune of 
Modem Hindu law. 
As a part of the continuing judicial reforms process in the country, necessar\ 
amendments were affected in personal law. The grounds of divorce and 
matrimonial relief have been made almost same under each personal law. The 
amendments and modifications have been made for reducing the difficulties 
of parties of suit in getting relief For example, the marriage laws reform in 
2001 amend the Special Marriage Act 1954, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, 
the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act 1936 and the Indian Divorce Act, 1969 as 
well as Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to fix the time limit for interim 
judgment within 60 days from serving of notices in divorce cases and removal 
of bar on alumni amount which has been a maximum of Rs. 500 per month. 
Under the Hindu law, the wife has an absolute right to claim maintenance 
from her husband but she loses her right if she deviates from the path of 
chastity. Her right to maintenance is codified in the Hindu Adoption and 
Maintenance Act, 1956. This Act recognizes the married women's right to 
reside separate & claim maintenance. The maintenance of wife in the 
matrimonial proceedings and after passing decree has been recognized in 
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section 24 and 25 of the Hindu marriage Act, 1955. Under these sections there 
is a provision of both alimony pendent elite and permanent alimony. 1 he 
passage of the Hindu code Bill in 1950 marked a turning point in the history 
of Hindu law. The effect of Hindu marriage Act was to prohibit polygamy and 
to increase the right of the divorced wife to maintenance or alimony and it is 
base on western lines enshrining progressive ideas. The Act applied to ever\' 
one in India except Muslim, Christians, Parsi and Jews. Since Jews are a 
negligible minority and Parsi are as well and since Christian were governed 
under an already modem or progressive law, Muslim remained only 
community with a distinct religious law that had not been reformed to reflect 
modem concept. 
Under the Muslim law, the Muslim Women (Protection Of Rights On 
Divorc) Act, 1986 provides the rights of maintenance to divorced Muslim 
women . Under section 3 of the Act she is entitled to a reasonable and fair 
provision to be made and paid to her within the Iddat period by her former 
husband. In addition,this Act provides that where a divorced Muslim women 
is unable to maintain herself after the period of Iddat the magistrate shall 
order directing such of her relative to maintain her. In the absence of such 
relatives the magistrate may direct state Waqf Board established under section 
13 of the Waqf Act, 1995, function in which the woman resides, to pay such 
maintenance as determined by him. 
The Parsi laws also provide for the alimony pendente lite and permanent 
alimony under section 39, 40 of the Parsi marriage and divorce (Amendment) 
Act, 1988. The amendments in 1988 were introduced according to the 
provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. 
The Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988 and the Hindu Marriage Act. 
1955, are the only statutes which recognize the husband right to seek 
maintenance from wife. In both the statutes, husband or wife both have right 
to seek maintenance if he or she has not the sufficient income to maintain him 
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or her. The remedy of divorce by mutual consent is also an example of the 
extension of the favour of Parsi spouses. 
If maintenance of wife under the Christian law is concerned we can say that 
there were same loopholes in the drafting of Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which 
has now to a certain extent been removed by the Indian Divorce 
(Amendment) Act 2001. The provision has been made for the dissolution of 
marriage by mutual consent. This is on the lines of the Hindu Marriage 
Act, 1955. But it is noteworthy that unlike the Hindu and Parsi law, only wife 
can seek the maintenance. If has not yet adopted the progressive ideas to 
provide the right to both the spouse. 
It is a noteworthy fact that the reforms and improvements in any area is a 
continuous process. It is not ultimate but it should always be kept in mind that 
in the area of personal laws the reforms must be introduced with a careful and 
responsible manner as the personal law touches the heart of the communities 
in a deep manner involving their sentiments and sceptibilities. 
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This dissertation which deals with the maintenance of wife under the Hindu 
law, Muslim law, Christian law and Parsi law. There is no doubt that all the 
personal laws have provided the due attention towards towards the elevation 
of the position of women in the society and have paid the due regard she may 
not be forced to face the untowards condition due to bad economic condition 
.The mode of fulfilling the performance of this duty may be different but the 
ultimate goal is same in all the personal laws. Each community, to more or 
less extent, has the influence of other sister communities as no communit} 
can remain isolated from the other in the society. 
During the study of Hindu law with regard to the maintenance of divorcee, it 
was felt that the position of Hindu women under Hindu Law, to a certain 
extent, stands improved now. She has acquired a new status and position in 
the society. She can get the maintenance from her husband under section 24, 
section 25 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and under section 18 of Hindu 
Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. 
Now turning towards the position of wife in Islam regarding maintenance, it 
is found that the classical Islamic law provides maintenance to the wife during 
the subsistence of marriage in the form of mewa-khori or kharch-i-pandan 
etc. . It also provides the maintenance to divorcee upto the period of iddat . 
Now the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce ) Act ,1986, which 
was enacted by Parliament of India to mitigate the effect of Shahbano 's 
judgement ,deals with the maintenance of Muslim divorcee. The main feature 
of this Act is not deemed contrary to the scheme as envisaged in section 125 
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, and it gives option to the husband and 
wife under section 5 of this Act to be governed either by the provisions of 
Criminal Procedure Code ,1973 or by the provisions of this Act. But the 
condition of the application of the section 5 of the Muslim Women 
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(Protection of Rights on Divorce ) Act ,1986, is that there must be an 
agreement between the husband and wife to be governed under any ol the 
statute whether it may be Cr.P.C. or the MusHm Women (Protection of Rights 
on Divorce ) Act ,1986. It means that the Muslim divorcee alone without the 
consent of her husband cannot claim the maintenance under sections 125 to 
section 128 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 . It may be pointed out that the 
crux shown in the dissertation is also noteworthy that there is a series of cases 
which shows the reluctancy of the judiciary not to apply the provisions of 
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act ,1986,in the 
maintenance cases of muslim divorcee and does prefer to apply the provisions 
of Criminal Procedure Code ,1973.This judicial trend is disturbing one and 
Muslims seem not satisfied by the behaviour of judiciary. 
In Christian community the cases regarding the maintenance of wife is dealt 
with the section 36 to section 38 of Indian Divorce Act, 1869. It is to be noted 
that the commission on the review of Administrative laws which was set up 
by the Central Government on the 8'^  May, 1998, has recommended the repeal 
of various enactments, such as the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction 
Act, 1926, the Indian and Colonial Divorce Jurisdiction Act, 1940, and the 
Indian Divorce Act, 1945, which were the British statutes relating to Christian 
personal laws that were in force at the time of making the recommendation . 
In order to give effect to the recommendation of law commission of India, 
Indian Divorce (Amendment) Act, 2001, has been enacted. This amendment 
Act has made some modifications regarding the maintenance of Christian 
women which has been discussed thoroughly in this dissertation work. 
The maintenance of wife in Parsi Community is dealt with the Section 39 to 
section 41 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1988. This Act incorporates 
the advantageous aspects of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955; Indian Divorce 
Act, 1869; Special Marriage Act, 1954; Matrimonial Causes Act, 1965; and 
the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939. The remedy of divorce by 
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